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The  Third United Nations  Conference  on the  Law  of the  Sea held its fourth 
session in New  York  from  15  March  to 7 May  1976. 
Definite progress was  made  during this session.  Nevertheless,  there are 
still considerable differences of opinion on  quite a  few  important  ~~estions. 
It is probable that the fifth session,  which  will be  held in New  York  from 
2  August  to  17  September 1976,  will determine  the future  of the Convention. 
The  alternatives are clear: either the Conference must  succeed during this 
session in drawing up an overall compromise  on  the most  important  outstanding 
problems,  on the basis of a  broad consensus or,  failing this,  a  new  session 
will have to be  planned.  In such.an eventuality it is highly likely that 
certain countries will take unilateral measures  with  regard to the creation 
qf  200  mile  exclusive  zones  or the exploitation of the international  sea-bed. 
The  questions under consideration at this Conference  are of prime  importance 
for the Community  and its Member  States.  Our  economic  future will be 
particularly influenced by the  rules  adopted in respect  of.  sU.ch  important 
questions  as  fishing,  the exploitation of the mineral  and  energy  resources 
of the  sea-bed and  freedom  of navigation.  It is also  a  matter of 
preserving what  the Community  has  already achieved and  of not  jeopardizing 
the future  extension of its achievements. 
Moreover,  the positions adopted by the Member  States at  the Conference 
have  a  definite effect on  their positions in the internal Community  debate 
on  the rules governing fishing in the  200  mile  exclusive  economic  zone. 
and vice versa.  This  shows  the need for the  Council to keep  a  close watch 
on  parallel developments  in both these areas. -2-
Although coordination of the positions of Member  States  (whether in regard 
to Community  or other matters)  has proved to be satisfactory on  a  number 
of· subjects, its effectiveness has  sometimes  left a  great deal to be 
desired,  in view of the reluctance of some  Member  States to accept  the 
obligations and  Community  procedures laid down  in this respect.  .On  other 
important subjects, it has  sometimes  not been possible to achieve  joint 
positions or the effectiveness of coordination has  suffered as a  result 
. of the fact that some  Member  States belong to other groups with common 
interests. 
It is clear that it is in the Community's  interest to avoid the unilateral 
measures mentioned above  through the introduction of a  Convention which 
the vast majority of delegations would  accept,  although not at any price. 
The  Community  and its Member  States must  adopt  joint positions on· the 
important  outstanding economic  questions,  with a  view both to fulfilling 
the obligations imposed  on  them  in this respect by the Treaty and 
contributing.to the successful  outcome  of the Conference.  It should 
moreover be pointed out that the Chairman  of the Conference,  in his closing 
statement at the  fourth session,  proposed that henceforth negotiations 
should be carried out among  the various groups. 
It is recalled that the Community  has been represented as  an  entity at  a 
series of important  international meetings  since the Conference  on  the  Law 
of the Sea began.  In particular,  one  can cite the common  actions undertaken 
by the  Co~unity and its member  States at the 7th Special  Session of the 
General  Assembly  of the United Nations, at the Conference  on  International 
Economic  Cooperation and within the  framework  of the World  Food  Council.  It 
cannot  be  envisaged that  the European Community  should slip back  from  these 
precedents in'the Conference of the  Law  of the Sea. 
Furthermore,  the preservation of the present  and future  competence of the 
Community  must  be  ensured by the inclusion of an  "EEC  clause11  in the final· 
provisions of the  Convention,  failing l-Thich  neither the  Community  nor its 
Member  States could become  contracting parties to the future  Convention.  It 
is essential that the  Council  adopts the final wording of this clause 
before the beginning of the next  session. 
The  Commission  points out,  moreover,  that the  Council  has,  at its meeting 
of 4  June  1974,  already agreed that  on  matters for which  the Community 
. is competent,  its position should be  adopted in accordance vd th the usual 
procedure  and that  on  matters of an  economic  nature or which  are  likely 
to  have  effect  on  common  policies,  the Member  States  should concert their 
positions in the presence of Commission  representatives  .• -3-
To  implement  this decision of principle,  the Commission  proposes that: 
a  representative of the  Commuriity  should point out at the 
opening of the Fifth Session of the Conference,  that,  taking 
into account  the provisions of the Treaty establishing the  .. 
European Economic  Community,  certain aspects of the Convention on 
the Law  of the Sea are Community  matters and  that therefore the 
European Economic  Community  has adopted  joint positions which will 
be presented in the  course of the  Conference; 
throughout  the Conference,  the representatives of the Member  States 
and of the Commission  shall so act as to ensure that,  whatever 
the circumstances,  a  common  or coordinated position can be 
adopted and  stated in a  Community  manner; 
the delegations  on  the spot  should  judge whether the difficulties 
which are liable to arise should be notified to the Community 
institutions in Brussels. 
The  Commission  requests the  Council  to adopt  the proposals above-
mentioned. 
The  Council will find in the Annex  a  description of the  proceedings 
of the Fourth Session of the Conference and detailed guidHnes put: 
forward for the Fifth Session. 
The  Commission  requests the  Council  to decide  on  these proposals 
before the  end  of July 1976,  so that the Community  and its Member 
States can  present  common  or coordinated positions,  as appropriate, 
at the Fifth Session of the Conference. 
It will also find below  a  summary  of the main  decisions  or guidelines 
submitted for its approval  on  each of the main  questions.  (The 
references in brackets relate to the more  detailed descriptions given 
in the Annex.) -4-
·  .  (i)  Exclusive  economic  zone 
- Acceptance  of the principle of the creation of a  200  mile 
exclusive economic  zone  (seep.  16  and  17); 
- Maintenance,  at the present  stage of work,  of the amendments 
submitted with regard to the rules governing living resources 
within this zone  (see p.  18,  19~  20  and  21); 
- Acceptance  of the provisions of the Revised Single Negotiating 
Text  concerning the rights of land-locked or geographically 
disadvantaged countries  (see  p.  20  and  21); 
Examination of the advisability of maintaining the amendments 
put  forward by the  Community  with regard to the provisions  of 
the Revised Single Negotiating Text  on  the definition of 
closed and semi-closed seas  (seep.  21  and  22,; 
Translation of provisions relating to the exclusive  economic 
zone  in order to establish compulsory procedures for settling 
disputes  (seep.  21). 
(ii)  Continental  shelf 
(see p.  27  and  28) 
-Acceptance 'of the principle of the extension of the continental·-
shelf beyond  200  miles.(see p.  28); 
-Adoption of a  common  position with regard to fixing the. outer 
limit  of the  continental shelf  (see p.  28); 
- Adoption of a  common  position with regard to the introduction 
of a  system for  sharing the income  accruing from  the resources 
of the  continental shelf beyond  200  miles  (seep.  28); 
-Adoption of a  fairly open  position on  the possibility of 
allowing the International Authority to grant the developing 
countries  exemptions  from  or reductions in contributions,  and 
on the question of whether  such  contributions  should be  paid 
to the  International Authority and/or to the development 
organisation recognised by the United Nations  (see p.  28); (iii)  International sea-bed 
(see p.  29  to 40) 
-5-
- Acceptance  of the principle of the creation of an Enterprise 
set up  for  operational  purposes by the  International Authority 
(see p.36); 
-Restriction of the powers  of the  International Authority to 
exploration and exploitation activities  (see p.35); 
- Application of commercial  principles to the operations of the 
Enterprise(see p.  36); 
- Opposition to the idea that the Enterprise  (or the Authority 
itself)  should be authorised to practice discrimination in the 
selling price of minerals  (see p.36); 
-Acceptance of the principle of distribtttion to the benefit 
of the developing countries of the major part  of the profits made 
by the Enterprise  (see p.  36); 
-Examination of other possibilities of taking into account 
special needs  of the developing countries; 
-Opposition to any exemption of the Authority and the Enterprise 
from  taxation and  customs  duties exceeding thatnormally granted 
to international organisations  (seep.  36  and  37); 
- Granting to the Community  a  seat  on  the Council  of the 
International Authority and of the Enterprise  (see p.  37~; 
-Adoption of a·common  position with regard to the provisions 
concerning  t~e financial arrangements  of the  International 
Authority and  of the Enterprise  (see p.  38); 
- Search for a  solution to prevent the creation of monopoly  or 
dominant  positions  (see P•  39); 
- Acceptance  of the principle of the provisional application of 
the provisions  of the future  Convention concerning the  sea-bed, 
provided that within two  years  of the  date  on  which the  Convention 
is opened  for  signature by the contracting parties,  at least 
one-third of the potential signatories have notified their 
acceptance of this provisional application or provided that, 
irrespective of any time  limit,  such notification has been  given 
by at least half the potential signatories (seep.  39  and 40); -6-
- Accecptance of the general  approach of the Revised Single Negotiating 
Text  with regard to the  arrangements  for settling disputes connected 
with the sea-bed (see p.  40). 
(iv}'Protection of the marine  environment  (see PP•  41  to 49) 
-Adoption of a  common  position. with regard to the provisions on pollution 
from vessels on the basis of a  system which vfould  give priority to the 
exercise of the flag State's rights v1hile  granting to the coastal State 
the control of a  specific 50  milo-wide  zone  where it would exercise 
precise and limited rights; 
- Adoption of common  positions in order to ensure the coherent  implementation 
of commitments  to be entered into in the future  Convention and  of those 
undert~cen by the member  Statesin the framework  of the execution of the 
Community's  environment  programme. 
(v) Scientific research  (see PP•  50  to 52) 
-Opposition to  a·generalized system whereby the  consent  of the coastal 
State has to be obtained for all scientific research in the economic 
zone,  unless: 
(a)  The  conditions under v;hich  the coastal State can v;ithhold its 
consent  are more  limited; 
(b)  A disputes  conciliation procedure is adopted; 
(c)  The  general  system for settling disputes  applies to scientific 
research  •  .. 
(vi) Transfer of marine technology (see pp.  53  and  54) 
Acceptance  of the principle of the  Revised Single Negotiating Text. 
(see P•  54) -7-
(vii)  Settlement of disputes  (see PP•  55  to 59) 
- Maintenance  of a  common  position in favour of a  compulsory  systeJ:J.  for 
-settiing iHsputes-, -considere-d.  as an  essentfareiement-of tile- future 
Canvention; 
- Application of the arbitration procedure,  where  one  of the parties 
to the dispute has  chosen this method  of settlement; 
Rest~ction of the nlliOber  of exceptions which may  be  invoked by_the 
coastal State in order to permit third States the better to  defend 
the~~ ~igh~-s-=------ - - - - - - -
(viii)  .Rules governing overseas· countries-and territories  (see  PP•  59  to 61) 
- Opposition to the "transitional provision" of the Reyised _Single  _ 
Negotiating Text  (second part);  comnion  position in favour of the 
amendments  to the original Article 136  put  forwUd by France and 
the Netherlands. 
(ix)  EEC  clause  (see pp.  10  to 15) 
The  Commission  recommends  that  the  Council adopt  the decision the 
text of which is given below. 
The  Commission  considers that if an  EEC  clause were  not  included in the 
future  Convention,  the Member  States could neither approve  nor sign 
this Convention insofar as it contained provisions relating-to matters 
in respect of which  the  Community  has -c-omp-etence:-- --- 8-
Recommendation for  a  Council Decision 
authorizing the Commission  to enter into negotiations at the Third United Nations 
Conference on the Law  of the  Sea to enable the European Economic  Community 
to become  a  contracting party to the International Convention on  the Law  of 
the Sea currently being drawn  up  by that  Conference 
THE  COUNCIL  OF  THE  EUROPEAN  COMMUNITIES,:: 
Having  regard to the Treaty establishing the European Economic  Community, 
Having  regard to the Recommendation  of the Commission, 
Whereas  the  International Convention on  the Law  of the Sea currently being 
drawn  up  by  the Third United Nations  Conference  on  the Law  of the Sea will 
contain certain provisions which  relate to matters in respect of which  the 
Community  is competent; 
Whereas  the  commitments  relating to these matters  can be  entered into only by 
the  Community;  wher~as, therefore,  it is.necessary that the Community  be  able 
to become  a  contracting party to the said Convention and  that the  latter 
contain a  clause making this possible, 
HAS  ADOPrED  THIS  DECISION: 
Sole Article 
The  Commission is hereby authorized to  enter into negotiations at the 
Third United Nations  Conference  on  the  Law  of the Sea with a  view to having 
inserted in the International C0nvention of the  Law  of the  Sea currently 
being drawn  up  by that  Conference  a  clause enabling the European Economic 
Community  to become  a  contracting party to the  said Convention. 
The  Commission  shall conduct  these negotiations in consultation with the 
representatives of the Member  States. List of main  abbreviations  used in the text 
SNT  Single Negotiating Text 
RSNT  Revised Single Negotiating Text 
LL  Land-locked countries 
GDS  Geographically Disadvantaged States 
ISBA  - International  Sea-bed Authority 
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duty  exemption for the international sea-bed authority. ANNEX 
REFORT  OF  THE  COMMISSION  TO  THE  COUNCIL  ON 
THE  FOURTH  SESSION  OF  THE  THIRD  UNITED 
NATIONS  CONFERENCE  ON  THE  LAW  OF  THE  SEA 
AND  PROR>SED  GUIDELINES  FQR  T.HE  FIETH 
SESSION  o::r  THE  CONFERENCE :1 
I.  OVERALL  SURVEY  OF  THE  FOURTH  SESSION 
General  proceedings 
The  Third United Nations  Conference  on  the  Law  of the  Sea held a  new  session 
in New  York  from  15  March  to 7 May  1976. 
The  Community  was  represented at the  Conference  as  an observer. 
The  previous  session of the  Conference,  held in Geneva  from  17  March  to 
9 May  1975 1  had  led to the establishment,  under the responsibility of the 
Chairman  of the  Conference  and the  Chairmen  of the three main  Committees, 
of a  "single negotiating text" covering all the  subjects on  the  Conference 
agenda. 
This is an unofficial text which  takes  account  of all the discussions which 
took place up  to the  end of the  Geneva  session.  It is not  an agreed compromise 
but  purely and  simply  a  working document  intended to help future  negotiations 
and to which the delegations are  completely free to make  any amendments. 
The  single negotiating text  comprises four  sections: 
the first  section,  prepared by the  Chairman  of the First  Committee,  deals 
with a  regime  for the  sea-bed beyond the limits of national  jurisdiction; -2-
the  second  section,  presented by the  Chairman  of the  Second  Committee,  deals 
with territorial seas,  straits used for international navigation,  the  economic 
zone,  the continental  shelf,  the high  seas,  land-locked countries, 
archipelagoes  and  the  regime  for islands and  enclosed and  semi-enclosed seas; 
the third section,  presented by the  Chairman  of the  Third  Committee,  deals 
with the protection and  preservation of the marine  environment,  marine 
scientific research and  the development  and  transfer of technology; 
the fourth part,  presented by  the  Conference  Chairman,  deals with the 
settlement of disputes1. 
Most  of the work  at the New  York  session of the  Conference  was  devoted to an 
article-by-article discussion of sections I, II  anc'l  III  of  "'.;L~  .Sinc:e  ':'ext  a.nd.  tho 
presentation of delegations'  amendments  to that text. 
Many unofficial meetings took place  alongside the meetings of the full  assembly 
and  of the  Conference  committees,  both as part  of  informal negotiating and 
consultation working groups  set up  on  the initiative of the  committee  chairmen 
in order to bring the various viewpoints closer together and within the 
traditional regional political groupings and groups  representing states with 
similar interests (e.g.,  a  group of land-locked and geographically disadvantaged 
countries).  The  object of th'ese  group meetings was  to establish a  common 
position among  their members  vis-a-vis the single text. 
1The  first three sections of the  single negotiating text  ~xere  prepared on  the 
basis of the results of the discussions held at the  Conference itself.  However, 
the fourth section (dealing with the  settlement of disputes)  was  prepared before 
this subject  had  been discussed at the  Conference. .. 
-3-
The  upshot  of these discussions  (both formal  and  informal)  was  the formulation, 
at the  end  of the  session,  of a  ~evised version of the  sin~le text, responsibility 
for '"hich would  be.  borne  by the  Chairmen  of the three  comm~  ttees I.  This version, 
like the  original version,  reflects the views  expressed by the delegations during 
the New  York  session and  is of equal  status.  The  articles of the  single text 
which  have  been changed in the  revised version are those for which  amendments 
commanding  a  large measure  of support within the  Conference  had been tabled. 
The  unchanged articles are those in respect  of which  no  amendments  were  proposed 
or where  such amendments  failed to attract sufficient  support  during the session, 
or again which dealt with subjects on  which  the antagonism of the positions 
expressed did not  allow negotiations to be  pursued. 
The  new  single text will  serve  as  a  basis for the discussions due  to take  place 
at the next  session of the  Conference.  This will be  held once  more  in New  York 
from  2  August  to  17  September 1976.  It will no  doubt  be  followed by an additional 
session waich,  depending on  whether or not the  1976  summer  session produces 
general  agreement,  should either finalize the terms of this agreement or  try 
to advance  negotiations towards  a  conclusion.  Should final  agreement  be possible 
on  the establishment  of an International  Convention  on·  the  Law  of the  Sea,  this 
will be  signed at  Caracas during a  final  session. 
1And  also the  Chairman  of the  Conference  as far as the  settlement  of disputes 
was  concerned  • -4-
II.  PROSPECTS  AND  ADIS  FOR  THE  NEXT  SESSION: 
In spite of the  apprehensions of a  technical and political nature of the Group 
of 11,  it was  decided to call a  new  session very close to the  end of the 
previous  session.  This was  partly at  the  insistence of the United States 
Delegation which  was  anxious  for the. Conference to arrive at  a  general  agreement 
before the entry into foroe  (1  March  1977)  of the legislation voted by  Congress· 
and  approved by the  President  on  fishing within the 200-mile  economic  zone 
and  at  a  sufficiently early date in order to prevent  Congress  from  also 
adopting national measures  on  the exploitation of the sea-bed.  These  internal 
pressures and  threats of unilateral action were  suggested in very strong terms 
by Dr  Kissinger _during his speech  on  the Law  of _the  Sea in New  York,  outside 
the  Conference,  on  8th April 1976. 
Other countries have  already established exclusive fishing areas  (e.g.,  Iceland) 
or are  on the point  of doing so very shortly (e.g., Norway  and  Canada). 
If forthcoming sessions of the  Conference  do  not  achieve its designated aims, 
by  establishing a  general  consensus  on  all main unresolved problems,  it is 
likely that  any  attempt  to  establish a  worldwide  system willifail ·for a 
time  and that  there will be  a  multicplici  ty of unilateral measures  of the 
type··a:escribeO.  above: -- -- -
Such  a  situation would  not  be  in the interests of the  Community  and its 
Member  States.  Even if the  Community  were  unilaterally to establish a  20D-
mile  economic  zone,  it would  suffer serious negative  consequences,  particularly 
as  regards freedom  of navigation and exploitation of the international sea-
bed.  These  negative effects would  probably outweigh  any  advantages gained 
by the creation of such  a  zone  (which,  ho\vever,  will become  imper~tive.) 
The  Community  therefore has  an  interest in supporting all efforts to ensure 
the  speedy conclusion of the Conference,  provided basic  Community  interests are 
satisfactorily upheld in the final text of the Convention. - 5-
Consequently,  the Commission  is convinced that it is essential for the  Community 
institutions to  reach agreement  in the main  areas where  differences of opinion 
still exist between the Member  States,  before the beginning of the fifth session 
of the Conference  on  2  August  1979. 
Unless  such  a  general consensus is reached,  the Member  States are likely to 
erode their own  negotiating position by uncoordinated,  and  even  contradictory, 
action.  Moreover,  the  absence of any solution to  some  of the differences of 
opinion among  the Nine  will not  improve  the  chances of the Conference achieving 
positive results. 
General  agreement  on  a  number  of m~or subjects would  already seem  to have  been 
achieved,  e.g.,  on the extent  of territorial wat.ers  and  the regime· governing 
the latter and  on  freedom  of navigation in straits (except  for the divergent  1  positions of some  Member  States regarding the demarcation of territorial waters)  • 
On  other important  subjects,  the outline and  even the details of a  general 
consensus  are beginning to emerge,  in particular on  the  principle of the 
exclusive economic  zone  and  on the creation of an  International Se&-bed  Authority. 
As  regards  the exclusive  economic  zone  (excluding questions  concerned with 
pollution and  navigation referred to  above)'  the major remaining disagreements 
are concerned with the  extent  and  exclusivity of the rights of coastal states 
which  are contested by  the· land-locked and  geographically-disadvantaged States. 
1cf. Article 14  of the  Second  Part of the Revised Single Negotiating Text. -6-
·As  regards the  International Sea-bed Authority and the Enterprise, it 
is necessary to determine the conditions for the exploitation of 
deeP-sea mineral  resources beyond the exclusive economic  zone  or the 
continental shelf.  Generally speaking, the. conflict  on  th~s subject  is 
between  developed and  developing countries. 
The  new  text is some  improvement  on  the old as far as the developed 
countries are concerned and,  on  this basis, it seems  possible that 
common  positions on  the  basic questions will be  achieved. 
However,  serious differences of opinion exist  on  other major topics. 
Some  ambiguities still remain  in the Single Negotiating Text  with regard 
to freedom of navi ation in the exclusive economic  zone  and this 
accounts for the desire of the  maritime nations  including most  of the 
Community's Member  States) to do  their utmost  to preserve this freedom 
and for the very tough negotiating position of the developing countries 
which,  while not necessarily attaching much  importance to preventing 
pollution from  shipping,  insist on  extensive rights _for  coastal states 
as  regards navigation control.  This  standpoint has  probably been 
adopted in order to obtain concessions as  regards other parts of 
the Convention  (with special reference to the International Authority 
and the Enterprise). 
As  far as the continental shelf is concerned,  the question is whether 
or not the exclusive  rights of coastal states should extend beyond 
the  200  mile  limit  (or beyond a  certain depth,  e.g.,  500  metres)  and 
whether the profits from  exploitation of that part of the shelf should 
be  shared between the coastal state and other countries.  The  land-
locked or geographically disadvantaged countries have in general 
.. - 7-
been against  such an'extension. ·The coastal countries with a  wide 
continental shelf have  taken the opposite view. 
As  regards rights over resources in overseas countries and territories, 
the provisions to be applied in such cases revealed a  clash of opinion 
between,  on  the one  band,  many  of the developing .countries and  socialist 
countries and,  on  the other,  the  developed countries concerned. 
In  the opinion of the Commission,  this brief and  necessarily simplified 
description of the current position on  key questions highlights the 
general need for the Community  and  the Member  States to decide together 
on  clearly defined common  positions. - 8-
TII.  GENERAL  ASPECTS  OF  Coo.ruNITY  COORDINATION  AND  THE  ""EEC  CLAUSE" 
(a)  General aspects 
There  was  closer coordination among  the positions of the Member 
States in New  York than at previous  sessions of the Conference, 
both as regards the  range of subjects covered and the  results 
achieved.  Nevertheless,  the: common  action of the Member  States 
still had its negative sides'.- -
On  the positive aspects of Community  coordination, it should 
be  strongly emphasized that  some  important  matters of Community 
interest,  on  which it had hitherto been  impossible to achieve 
any real  exchange  of views between the delegations because of the 
attitude of some  Member  States, were  discussed at coordination 
meetings in New  York.  This was  the case,  for example,  with regard 
to problems  connected with the continental shelf. 
Secondly,  the Community  coordination work  carried out both in 
Brussels prior to the New  York  session and  during the  session 
itself, enabled the Community  or the Member  States to adopt, 
according to the circumstances,  common  positions at the Conference 
on  many  points.  These  included the  regime  for fishing in the 
economic  zone,  the sea-bed regime,  scientific research and 
transfer of technology.  These  common  positions were  expressed, 
either in the  form of Commission  declarations or as amendments 
to the Single Negotiating Text,  as the situation required.  In 
several cases,  the written text of these declarations or.common 
amendments  was  distributed to all delegations at the  Conference~ 
accompanied usually by a  covering note.clearly stating their origin. 
These  Community  attitudes were perceived as such by  the Conference 
and will, no  doubt,  facilitate_the ultimate adoption of an  "EEC 
clause" which shall  b~ examined later in this  docu:nent. -9-
However,  these positive aspects  of Community  coordination should not be 
allowed to mask  the negative aspects. 
First of all,  some  of the amendments  were  presented jointly at the 
Conference  only at the cost of disguising certain differences of opinion 
as regards the basis and/or extent of the Communi ty1 s competence.\, (We 
shall be returning to these problems in Part IV  of this· -report.) 
Secondly,  as at previous sessions of the Conference,  some  Member  States 
continued,  albeit to a  less disturbing degree,  to participate 
individually in the work  of some  extra-community pressure groups,  without 
having ensured adeguate CC)ordination with delegations  from  other Membe.r  _ 
States.  Thus  certain delegations 
--- .. lontinued-t-o  participat-e aCtively-in-the work of the . 
group  of-land.:.;iocked and geographically disadvantaged countries and 
underwrote  some  of the ini  tiative~d texts put  forward by the group. 
However,  some  of these teXts  covered subjects dealt with by other texts 
presented by the Nine. 
Lastly,  on  several  important topics  (continental shelf,  demarcation of 
the economic  zone  between adjacent states or states facing one  another, 
marine po+lution from  navigation,  cooperation between coastal  states 
bordering on  closed or semi-closed seas) the coordination meetings failed 
to produce  common  viewpoints and divergent  opinions were  expressed by the 
Member  States at the Conference which basically reflected a  split as 
between coastal.:__  _ c_\ States and  geographically disadvantaged· -
States. 
~he foregoing survey reveals that the main aim  of the coordination work 
to be carried out prior to the next  session or sessions of the Conference 
must be to.reduce these differences by preparing common  positions which 
will serve to assert the primacy of the links which unite the Member 
States within the Community  as  compared with those which t~~  ~~e_m_ ~o 
outside interests. - 10-
(b)  The  EEC  clause 
With  regard to this question,  the importance of which was  stressed 
in the communication from  the Commission  to the Council  of 
18  February 1976  (Doc.  COM(76)59  final)  on  problems which the 
introduction of economic  zones  of 200  miles poses for the Community, 
and which  has since been discussed on  several  occasions by the 
Permanent 'Representatives Committee  and by the Council itself,  the 
Commission would  first of all briefly recall that when  an  international 
agreement deals in whole  or in part with matters for which the 
Community  has  competence,  the Community  alone is competent by virtue 
of these matters to enter into commitments  relating to the third 
States concerned  • 
..  ~h~~s  nor-::-n~_~otiab:e  ::--equi~·~:ner~t  o_f._!_}~_e_  Qorr;.::l~VJ.i t.Y  itse~ f  si;:;nir.~ 
ar:·  a_e;!"eer;-~sr::.t  ir~  res.f..ect  of -:crtain  ~nc:tte.:~:·o  is uot  onl.r  ~ reflE.ctior: 
of tile  ir:ternc..2.  s~··steG"I  cf allocating  cor;peter:ceG  l·et\t\·ee!i.  the  l·iewl:er 
st·a·-~ ~s o: the  Con11r..w1i ttir 1  but  2.lso  7Leet s  th9  necessitY·  th~t third Dt u.tes  \Jhich 
are  si6natories to an international  agreement  should receive a  legal guarantee that 
they have contracted with parties capable of honouring all the 
obligations laid down  in the agreement. 
In order that the Community  may  be able to sign an agreement  dealing 
with matters for which it has  competence,  the agreement  must  include 
a  clause entitling the Community  to sign.  In the absence of such 
a  clause,  the Member  States are not entitled to sign the agreement in 
the Communi ty1s  stead.  · 
These  principles and their consequences  show  why  an EEC  clause needs 
to be inserted in the future  Convention  on  the  Law  of the Sea. 
The  Revised Single Negotiating Text,  which is regarded at this stage 
as the blueprint of that Convention,  contains a  number  of provisions 
relating to matters in which  the Community  is at present vested with 
its own  exclusive powers. - ll-
These  powers  relate to the following matters1 
- Provisions governing the living resources  of the  economic  zone. 
The  Single Negotiating Text  (Articles 50,  51,  59  and  60  of Part II)  empowers 
coastal states to: 
- determine the permissible catches of living resources in their economic 
zone,  taking account  of conservation needs; 
-determine their capacity to harvest these resources; 
- grant to third States,  on  the basis of agreements,  whether involving third 
States in general,  or land-locked or geographically disadvantaged States, 
a  right of access to, or a  share in,  the exploitation of a  proportion of 
these resources. 
The  effect of the establishment  of the  common  organization of the market  in 
fishery  products  (see Regulation  (EEC)  No  100/76 of 19  January 1976,  OJ  No  L 20 
of 28  January 1976,  p.  1)  and of the common  structural policy for the fishing 
industry (Regulation  (EEC)  No  101/76 of 19  January  1976,  OJ  No  L 20  of 28  January, 
P•  19),  has  been .to  transfer to the  Community  the right to exercise the  above-
mentioned  powers. 
On  the  one  hand,  the  Community  is vested with its own  exclusive powers  on  the 
basis of Article 43  of the EEC  Treaty,  Article  102  of the Act  of Accession and 
Article 4 of Regulation  (EEC)  No  101/76  to take and  enforce against third States 
conservation and management  measures of the same  .nature  as ·those  laid down  in 
Articles 50  and  51  of the  Revised  Single Negotiating Text.  · 
On  the other hand,  the  second  subparagraph of Article 2(1)  of Regulation  (EEC) 
No  101/76  lays down  that  Member  States shall  ensure equal  conditions of access 
to and use  of the fishing grounds  situated in the  waters  subject to their sovereignty 
or jUrisdiction for all fishing vessels flying the flag of  a  Member  State and 
registered in  Community  territory.  This principle of equality of access,  which 
also applies in all zones  placed under the  jurisdiction of a  Member  State,  will 
consequently apply to their future  economic  zones.  The  result is that none  of 
the Member  States will be  able to  grant  fishing rights in these  zones to third 
States,  since these rights are  not  vested in them  but are  indivisible between 
1A more  detailed analysis  of these  conditions is contained in a  Commission  working 
paper of 20  May  1976  (Doc.  COM(76)  •••  ). - 12-
all the Member  States.  Any  negotiations undertaken under Articles 51, 
59  and  60  of the Revised Single Negotiating Text will  thus be based on 
the powers  of the Community  itself, as  embodied in the Directives to be 
adopted by the Council  on  a  proposal  from  the Commission. 
- Sea-bed 
•' 
The  powers  of the Community  in the field of commercial  policy (Article 113 
of the  EEC  Treaty)  are partially affected by the provisions of the Revised 
Single Negotiating Text relating to the international  sea-bed  (Articles 9 
and 60),  which  lay  do~~ that: 
*  activities carried out in the international  sea-bed area should "foster 
the healthy  d~velopment of the world  economy  and  a  balanced growth in 
international trade",  an objective which  accords  very closely with the 
objectives of the  common  commercial  policy set  out in Article 110 of 
the EEC  Treaty; 
*  the interests of developing countries which are producers  of minerals 
or raw materials which will  also be exploited in the international  area 
should be protected by the conclusion of worldwide  agreements  designed 
to promote  the  efficiency and stability of markets  for the categories 
of products  originating in the area.  It will be recalled in this 
connection that by virtue of its powers  in the field of commercial 
policy the Community  is, at this stage,  a  contracting party to a  number 
of international  commodity  agreements  (wheat,  cocoa,  coffee arid tin). 
:£  During a  transitional period,  a  limit should be set  on  total production 
from  the area "so as not  to  exceed the projected cumulative growth 
segment  of the nickel market  during that period".  To  the extent  that 
it will affect  the volume  of international trade in the products in 
question,  the Community's  commercial  policy may  be implicated as a 
result of this limitation on  production. 
*  The  assets,  property,  operation and transactions of the International 
Sea-bed Authority and  the Enterprise  should be  exempt  from  all customs 
duties.  This  exemption may  not be granted in the Community  except by 
the Community  by virtue of its powers  in the field of commercial  policy. 
The  Community  will also have  sole authority,  by virtue of the  same - 13-
powers,  to lay down  the customs  treatment,  including rules of  or1~n, 
applicable to the products  originating in the international area and 
imported into the Community.  (See  Appendix  I). 
- PreserVation of the marine  environment 
The  Single Negotiating Text  (Part III) provides that the states shall lay 
down  national laws  and regulations to prevent,  reduce  and control pollution 
of the marine  environment  and urges  them  to lay down  global  and  regional 
rules,  standards and practices in this field. 
The  Community  as  such is already a  contracting party to an international 
convention containing provisions similar to these in the Single Negotiating 
Text.  This is the Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution from 
Land-based Sources,  signed in Paris  on  21  February 19741. 
By  concluding this Convention on  its own  behalf,  the Community  became 
vested with the neoessary·powers  to take and apply in the Community 
appropriate measUres  to combat  pollution,  as provided for in that 
Convention~  The  measures to be taken by the Community  correspond precisely 
to those laid down  in Article 17  of the Single Negotiating Text  (Part III). 
Furthermore,  the Counqil  has recently adopted,  in the form  of a  Directive, 
common  rules relating to pollution caused by certain dangerous  2  substances released into the marine  environment  of the Community  •  This 
Directive applies in particular to the territorial waters of the Member 
States.  It empowers  the Council  to adopt,  on  a  proposal  from  the 
Commission  and in respect .of the various dangerous  substances which it 
lists, limited amounts  which may  not be  exceeded by the rules relating 
to emission.  The  Directive thus provides the Community  with powers  the 
nature and purpose of which are the  same  as  those vested in states by the 
Revised Sin.gle Negotiating Text.  · 
1The  Decision of 3 March  1975  whereby the Council  concluded this Convention 
on behalf of the Community  is published in OJ  No  L 194  of 25  July 1975, 
P•  5  et seq. 
2This Directive, which has not 
Council  on 3  and 4 May  1976. 
in Document  R/815/76  (ENV  33) 
3  May  1976. 
yet been published,  was  adopted by the 
The  text of the Directive is contained 
of 9 April 1976  and Corr.  3 (F,  N)  of - 14-
Finally, it should be  noted that the Convention  on  the Protection of the 
Mediterranean Sea against  Pollution,  signed in Barcelona on  16  Februar,y  1976, 
under the auspices of the United Nations,  is open  to signature or 
accession by the Community  (Articles 24  and 26).  This  Convention,  which 
deals in principle with all sources of pollution, is currently accompanied by 
two  Protocols,  one  of which  relates to pollution by dumping  operations 
by vessels and aircraft. · 
On  6  May  1976,  the Commission  proposed to the Council that the Communi1Y 
sign the Barcelona Convention and  the Protocol  on  pollution by  dumping  • 
When  the Community  has become  a  contracting party to the Barcelona Convention 
and its Protocol, it will exercise in the maritime  zone  in question powers 
which are the same  as those vested in the States by Article 20  of the 
Single Negotiating Text  (Part III), relating to pollution caused by  the 
dumping  of waste  and other substances. 
Legal  experts from  the Member  States and the Commission  have  prepared 
a  draft of a  Community  participation clause for inclusion in the future 
Law  of the Sea  Convention which  has up  to now  received the approval of 
eight delegations.  The  clause is worded  as follows:  · 
"Cu~toms unions,  communi ties and  other regional  economic  groupings 
exercising powers  in the areas covered by this Convention may 
be  parties to this Convention"2. 
1see Doc.  R/1146/76  (ENV  49)  of  10  May  1976. 
2rn addition to this Community  participation clause,  the text drawn  up  by 
the legal experts from  the Member  States and the Commission  contains a 
"safeguard" clause authorizing the Member  States to retain or institute 
amongst  themselves special rules derogating if necessary from  that 
Convention.  This  safeguard clause is worded  as follows:  "Nothing in the 
present  Convention  shall prevent the Member  States of such  customs  unions, 
communities  or other regional  economic  groupings from  implementing 
provisions relating,  in accordance with the rules governing such customs 
unions,  co~unities or other regional  economic  groupings,  to the  mutual 
granting to nationals of such states of national treatment or any  other 
special treatment". 
The  Commission  considers that  such  a  clause would  be useful,  but that 
it could not be a  substitute for the Community  participation clause which 
is the only valid way  of covering those areas for which  the Community, 
as distinct from  the Member  States, is competent. - 15-
This wording,  which  refers only indirectly to the Community,  has been 
designed in such a  way  as to seek to gain at the Conference the support, 
not  only of the nine Member  States, but of states engaged in a  process 
of regional integration more  or less comparable  with that of the Community 
and,  in consequence,  to enlist ''allies" for the Community  cause. 
For the moment,  only informal approaches have  been  made  to non-member 
countries on  the subject  of the EEC  clause. 
The  Commission  departments  consider that such approaches  must  be followed 
up  through the appropriate channels. 
This period of unofficial approaches must,  however,  be  terminated quickly 
since the next  session of the Conference is to examine  the draft final 
clauses which  the Chairman  of the Conference  Drafting Committee  has 
been instructed to draw  up  and it is among  these final clauses that 
the EEC  clause is to be placed.  The  Community  ought  therefore to be 
in a  position to  submit  a  formal  proposal for the EEC  clause at the 
summer  1976  session of the Conference.  Accordingly,  the Commission 
proposes that the Council  reach a  swift decision on  this question.  When 
the  Council  has taken its decision,  the final text of the approved clause 
can  be  distributed (accompanied by suitable commentary)  to all the 
delegations at the Conference. - 16-
IV •  MAIN  QUESTIONS  DISCUSSED 
The  main  questions under discussion at the  Conference  are the following: 
1.  the exclusive economic  zone; 
2.  the  continental  shelf; 
3·  the  international  sea-bed; 
4•  protection of the marine environment; 
5·  marine  scientific research; 
6.  the transfer of technology; 
1·  the  settlement  of disputes; 
8.  provisions relating to the  overseas countries and territories. 
The  following comments  relate to these various questions.  Generally speaking, 
they contain a  progress report on  Community  coordination,  an analysis of the 
discussions at the  Conference  and  of the  Revised Single Negotiating Text  and 
indicate what  action the  Community  might  take at forthcoming sessions of the 
Conference. 
1.  The  exclusive  economic  zone 
{a)  Principle of the establishment  of the  economic  zone  and its general 
characteristics 
The  Single Negotiating Text  establishes the principle of the introduction 
of economic  zones  of 200  miles measured  from  the base lines used to determine 
the width of territorial waters1• 
It lays down  (Article 44)  that  in this  zone  the coastal  ~tates shall have 
"sovereign rights" in respect  of exploration and  exploitation of natural 
resources,  "exclusive  jurisdiction" as  regards scientific research and 
"jurisdiction" as regards the  preservation of the marine  environment. 
Fur1hermore,  all states,  whether coastal  states or not,  shall have  freedom 
of navigation and overflight  and  the  freedom  to lay underwater cables and 
pipelines in the  economic  zone  and  to use  the sea for other internationally 
lavrful  purposes relating to navigation and  communications  (Article 46). 
1Thus,  on  the basis of territorial waters  extending twelve miles,  the  economic 
zone  would  cover  188  miles.  However,  the  economic  zone  is designated a 
200 mile  zone. - 17-
During the Conference debates which they prompted,  these prov1s1ons 
have  on  the whole  received the  support  of the coastal states.  There 
are,  however,  reservations on  the part  of the land-locked and 
geographically disadvantaged states which,  whilst not  opposing the 
actual principle of the establishment of the  zone,  would  like -to 
reduce its extent and  the exclusivity of the rights which the coastal 
states would  exercise over it. 
· Community  efforts to adopt  a  coordinated position vis-&-vis these 
provisions have  been made  difficult qy  the attitude of Belgium  which 
has  general reservations  on  the basic concept  of an economic  zone. 
The  other Member  States,  acting in coordination,  have therefore tabled 
amendments  to the Single Negotiating Text  with the aim  of improving 
the  cohesion between the general definition of the rights and  obligations 
of the coastal state and the definition contained elsewhere in the 
Single Negotiating Text  as regards the extent of rights and obligations 
in specific areas and  of making it clearer that,  insofar as the  economic 
zone  is not  covered qy  special rules, it will remain an integral part 
·Of  the high seas and will thus be  subject to the corresponding provisions. 
Although they were  supported by  other maritime  powers  (United States, 
Japan,  USSR)  anxious to safeguard the freedom  of navigation in the 
economic  zone,  these amendments  proposed by the Member  States were  not 
included in the Revised Single Negotiating Text  which reproduces the 
original Single Text  virtually unchanged  and  with the  same  ambiguities. 
The  Community  should not relax its efforts to secure the acceptance of 
these amendments  at the next  session of the Conference,  all the more  so 
as it has the backing of other influential countries  (in particular the 
United States and the USSR).  · 
It goes without  s~ing that this will only be  possiole if Belgium,  which 
· up  to now  has  had general reservations on  the economic  zone  question, 
accepts the principle of such a  zone,  thus enabling the Community  to 
submit,  on its own  behalf,  proposals  on matters relating thereto. - 18-
--
(b)  /-Rules  concerning living resources  in the  economic  zone 
· ( i)  Anal:ysis  of the Single Negotiating: Text 
The  main provisions of the Single Ne~tiating Text  discussed in 
New  YGrk  (Articles 50,  51,. 58  a.nd  59)  are as  follows: 
- the coastal state shall determine the authorized catch of 
living resources in its economic  zone  while  ensuring that 
these resources are not  jeopardized b,r  over-fishingJ 
- the coastal state shall determine its capacity to harvest 
the living resources in its economic  zone.  If it does  not 
possess the capacity to take the whole  authorized catch, it 
shall reach agreement  with other States granting them  access 
to the surplus; 
- when  allocating this surplus,  the coastal state shall take 
special account  of the significance of the zone's renewable 
resources for its own  eoon~  and its other national interests, 
the provisions laid down  on  behalf of land-locked or 
geographically disadvantaged countries (see below),  the needs 
of developing countries in the same  region or subregion and 
the "need to reduce  economic  fluctuations in those States 
whose  nationals have  been regularly engaged in fishing in the 
zone  or who  have done  a  substantial amount  of work  in the 
field of research or the location of stocks"; 
- the State receiving part of a  coastal state•s·surplus living 
resources shall comply with the regulations issued by that 
state; 
- without  interfering with the right of the coastal state to 
determine the volume  of the anthorized catch in its zone  and 
the extent of its capacity to take this catch,  land-locked 
states shall have  the right to participate on  an equal footing 
in exploiting the living resources of the economic  zones  of 
adjacent coastal states on the basis of bilateral subregional 
or regional agreements.  However,  developed  land-locked states 
shall be allowed to exercise their rights only within the 
economic  zones  of neighbouring developed coastal states 
(Article  5B  of the Single Negotiating Text).  Similarly,  the 
developing ooa.stal states situated in a.  region or subregion - 19-
where  geographical features make  these states particularly 
dependent  on  fishing the living resources of the economic 
zones  of adjacent States in order to satisfy the food 
requirements of the population,  and  the developing coastal 
states which cannot  claim their own  economic  zone,  shall have 
the right to participate on  an equitable basis in exploiting 
the living resources in the economic  zones  of other states in 
the same  region or subregion. (See Article  59) 
(ii)  Community  coordination 
The  Member  States have  agreed on  a  series of amendments  to the 
provisions of the Single Negotiating Text  analysed above,  with 
the aim  of: 
eliminating as far as possible any arbitrariness in the 
decisions to be  taken by  the coastal states when  determining 
the volume  of the anthorized catch and their harvesting capacity 
in the  zone,  so  as to conserve living resources and  safeguard 
third countries' fishing rights; 
obliging the coastal state allocating the surplus of the 
authorized  catch which it is unable to harvest itself to 
consider the interests of the states which  traditionally fish 
in its zone,  to consult these states when  wishing to extend 
its harvesting capacity substantially and,  in such  an 
eventuality,_ to  1~  down  a  reasonable period of adaptation; 
deleting from  Article 51  of the Single Negotiating Text  the 
indicative list of questions that m~  be  governed by  coastal 
states' regulations which  third countries will have  to respect 
when  exercising fishing rights in these countries•  zones.  The 
wording of sane  of these questions suggesis that the coastal 
state could restrict the  scope  of these rights in a  more  or 
less arbitrary fashion. 
The  Chair has tabled these various amendments  at the Conference. 
Because  of Belgium's opposition to the very concept  of the economic 
zone  and because of the United Kingdom's  refusal to accept that the 
subjects covered b,y  these amendments  are at present subject to - 20-
Community  jurisdiction at the current stage of the Council's 
discussions  on the content of the common  fisheries policy 
within the framework  of the Community's  future  economic  zone, 
it has not  been possible to table these amendments  specifically 
on  behalf of the Community.  These  difficulties have had to be 
concealed b.y  means  of circumlocutions.  However,  the majority 
of delegations from  non-member  countries do  not  seem  to doubt 
that the amendments  forwarded are a  fair reflection of the 
Community  position. 
The  Community  has  tabled no  amendments  on  the fishing rights of 
land-locked and  geographically disadvantaged countries as they 
do  not  appear to pose  any problems  for the Community. 
(iii)  Conference deliberations and the Revised Single Negotiating Text 
Several delegations  (United States, Japan,  USSR  and  other East 
European countries and Greece)  supported the Community's 
amendments  or put  forward  amendments  along the  same  lines. 
The  most  intransigent coastal states expressed views  opposed to 
those of the Community  and  tabled amendments  aimed at reducing 
still further third countries' fishing rights in the waters of 
coastal states. 
Within both the official framework  of the Conference  and  the 
informal discussion groups1  the group of land-locked and 
geographically disadvantaged countries tabled amendments  to the 
Single Negotiating Text  aimed,  on the one  harid,  at gaining 
recognition of their right to share in the decisions to be  taken 
by  neighbouring coastal states on  determining the volume  of the 
authorized catch and  these  states• harvesting capacity and,  on 
the  other hand,  at obtaining their own  fishing rights in the 
zones  of these same  states over and  above  the surplus reserved 
for third countries in general.  Despite certain attempts at 
compromise,  these  demands  by  land-locked and geographically 
disadvantaged countries failed to secure the approval of the 
coastal states. 
1 . 
In particular the Evensen  group,  named  after its chairman,  the Norwegian 
Minister. - 21-
The  Revised Single Negotiating Text  (Article 50  et seq.)  and the 
original Single Negotiating Text  are virtually identical.  The 
Revised SBT  has taken into consideration only a  few  minGr  points 
contained in the Community  amendments  and,  in the absence of even 
a  modicum  of agreement  on  the rights of the land-looked and 
geographically disadvantaged countries,  contains no  new  prGvisiGns 
on  this point which is still negotiable. 
(iv)  Conclusions  and proposed guidelines for the next session of the 
Conference 
At  the present  stage aDd  taking into account  the considerable 
support for the solutions it put  forward,  the Community  will 
continue its efforts to get these accepted.  It also eught  to 
continue to give its approval to the provisions of the Single 
Negotiating Text as it stands vis-8.-vis the rights of land-looked 
or geographically disadvantaged countries.  Furthermore,  it should 
seek to obtain provisions  resulting in obligatory·dispute  settlement 
procedures. 
(o)  The  question of closed or semi-closed seas 
Articles 133-135  of the Single Negotiating Text  discussed at New  York  contain 
special provisions on  those closed or semi-closed seas consisting largely 
of the territorial waters or economic  zones  of two  or more  coastal states. 
They  lSU"  down  in particular that those states with a.  shoreline on  these seas 
shall coordinate the management,  conservation,  exploration and  exploitation 
of·the marine living resources either directly or through an appropriate 
regional  organization. 
The  Community  coordination meet  in~  he~d_ at :f3ru.ss.els  ~- ~.!'le!l.~t  New. ~C?~k 
revealed that the Community  would benefit  from  a  strengthening of these  \ 
provisions in order to  prompt.  certain non-member  Baftic- a.tid  Mediterranean countries  to 
·negotiate agreements with the Community to solve the prC11blems  arising from 
the establishment of economic  zones  affecting traditional fishing areas. 
It appeared that the negotiation  of agreements  Qf  this kind could bring 
cert'a.in advantages to the Community,  as  some  of its Member  States have 
traditionally fished iri these saa.s.  This  consideration has  led the Member ~ 22-
States to agree  on  the presentation of a  text which,  on  the  one  hand, 
proposed  a  definition of closed or semi-closed seas covering the case 
of the Baltic or the Mediterranean  tho~h not  of the North Sea  (where 
the Community's  interests are  different~ and,  on  the other hand, 
changed  the obligation to cooperate laid down  in the Single Negotiating 
Text  into an obligation to negotiate agreements  on  traditional fishing 
rights. 
However,  in view of the scant  support given to the Community  amendment 
on  the definition of closed and  semi-closed seas,  it appears that it 
would  be  better to abandon any desire to change  the cooperation commitment 
in the Single Negotiating Text  into a  negotiation commitment. 
The  Revised Single Negotiating Text  has not  taken into account  the 
Community  amendment  on  the definition of closed and  semi-closed seas and 
has adopted an amendment  supported by the United Kingdom  on  cooperation 
between riparian states.  It appears that the Community  has  relatively 
little chance  of having its views  on  a  restrictive definition of closed 
or semi-closed seas adopted at the next session.  In these circumstances, 
it:.  should examine  the  advisability of mairitaining its amend_rnents  to  tl1e 
Sirtgle .J:Iegotiating Text.·  ·  · 
2.  The  continental shelf  ------------
(i)  Analysis of the Single Negotiating Text 
The  rights of states on  the continental shelf adjacent to their 
coasts were  laid down  in the 1958  Geneva Convention.  This stipulates 
that coastal states shall exercise "sovereign rights" on  the 
continental shelf for the  purpose of exploration and  of exploiting 
their natural resources,  i.e., mainly oil and  gas  deposits.  However, 
the 1958  Convention did not  define the outer limit of the continental 
shelf;  it l~s down  that the rights of the coastal state shall 
extend to a  depth of 200  isobatbic metres or1  beyond  this limit, to 
the point permitted by technological development.  This  "open" 
definition and the exclusive nature of the guaranteed rights means 
that the only question really open  to discussion relates to the 
establishment  of an outer limit for the continental shelf.  Those 
states possessing an extensive continental shelf,  basing their claim - 23-
on  a  decision taken by  the  International Court  of Justice in 19691, 
state that their rights should extend to the outermost  edge 
of the continental shelf in accordance with the doctrine of 
vested  rights.  I  In the case of the less well situated 
countries the continent&2  shelf should on  no  account  extend 
beyond the economic  zone  •  In a  nutshell,  therefore,  the problem 
is to decide  what  system  should be  applied when  the continental 
shelf extends be.yond  200  miles. 
The  solution proposed  in Articles 62  and 69  of the Single. 
Negotiating Text  consists in granting coastal states "soverei~m 
r~ghtJ~ on  the continental shelf up to a  distance of 200  nautical 
m1les  or,  when  the natural extension exceeds this limit, to the 
outer edge  of the continental shelf.  However,  the coastal state 
would  be obliged to make  a  payment  or make  contributions in kind 
in order to operate beyond  200 miles;  the rate of ~ents  or 
contributions would  correspond to a  percentage of the value or 
volume  of production resulting from  this ex:ploi tation.  The 
International Authority (probably the same  organization that 
will be responsible for the international se&-bed)  would  be 
responsible for collecting p~ents or contributions.  It would 
be  empowered  to waive  contributions from  developing countries. 
It would allocate the  sums  received on  the basis of  im~rtial 
criteria bearing in mind  the  interests and needs of these countries. 
1Between  the Federal Republic  of Germany  and,  respectively,  Denmark  and 
the Netherlands. 
2It should be  pointed out that according to the doctrine of the economic  zone 
the rights of the coastal state apply to the zone's underground resources as 
well as its water-column resources. 
3Approximately 44  countries have  a  continental shelf extending beyond  the 
limit of 200  nautical miles;  only 16  of these coU.ntries  derive  a.n;y  real 
profit from ·operations beyond this limit.  The  countries involved are 
relatively important  (Canada,  Australia, Madagascar,  United Kingd(!!l,  Brazil, 
New  Zealand,  South Africa,  Namibia,  USSR,  United States, France, Ghana, 
India,  Ireland,,  Denma;rk,  Portugal,  Sri Lanka and Qnan) •  . 1 
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(ii)  Communi.t:y  coordination 
The  questions relating to the continental shelf were  discussed 
at a  number  of Community  coordination meetings during the :New 
York  session;  these meetings were  the first held on  this subject. 
'fl!e_9oJ!llll.i ss_iop.[:f:c~_?Ej;_fi~_Qt  s-l~E!:Y_e  ~-f>?ni  --!; h~·.  ~iember  _  .  .St-~ t  e.S.. a-~o-rki  ~g-:do  c ument 
I  in  whic~'- a:tt~I'  .E~-~-~lli_~g the c?_~~J.!:r:'s  __  de.pend~~~~  __<?n  __ th~  __ out_~~,d_e 
world  for its energy supplies, it1sets out the Counoi19s  objectives 
aimed at reducing this dependence  and examines  ~he potential 
hydrocarbon resources of the_  sedimentary basins situated .more  than 
200 miles from  the Member  States' European territories (notably in 
the  ~infiy ~  Rocka-ll  basin).  In the interests of the 
Community~ i1  subsequently came  out in favour of an  ext~nsion of 
the continental  shel~beyond 200 mileso 
Taking as a  bailie the findings  of the Evensen  group  (llew  York, 
December  197§)  and the proposals drawn up  by various countries 
(United States, New  Zealand,  Canada,  Ireland),  the Commission  then 
examined  the following problemas 
- system for defining the outermost  limit of the continental 
shelf2; 
Council Reselution of 17  September  1974  concerning a.  new  energy policy 
strategy for the Community,  Council Resolution of 17  December  1974  concerning 
Community  energy policy objectives for 1985,  Council Resolution of 
13  February 1975  concerning measures to be  implemented to achieve the 
Community  energy policy objectives adopted qy  the Council  on  17  September  1974 
(OJ  No  C 153  of 9 July 1975,  p.  1 et seq.). 
2Two  approaches have  been suggested for this definition.  The  rirat consists 
in taking a  series of fixed points at intervals of 60  nautical miles on  the 
foot  of the continental slope,  extending the straight linea b,y  60  nautical 
miles from  these points towards  the open  sea and  joining the eige of the 
straight lines by  a  second series of straight lines  ~0 miles long.  The  other 
method  consists in establishing a  ratio between the distance from·the  foot  of 
the continental slope and the thickness of the subjacent sedimentar,y rocks  and 
determining the  points at which this thickness represents no  mare  than 1  or  zfo, 
for example,  of the distance from  that point to the foot  of the slope.  The 
coastal states could choose  which  of these systems  they wished to  a.pp~. 
. . - 25-
-arrangements for sharing the  resources or profits accruing from the 
exploitation of  the  continental shelf beyond  200  miles  (payment  in 
cash or in kind,  payment  calculated as  a  percentage  of the value or 
volume  of production at the place of exploitation or as a  percentage 
of  the  difference between the value of production at the place of 
exploitation and  the  cost  of exploitation); 
-possibility of  granting the developing countries a  total or partial 
exemption in respect  of  these payments; 
-destination of the  contributions, i.e., whether the latter should be 
paid to  the International  Sea-bed Authqrity or to regional  or 
international development  organizations recognized by the United  Nations. 
The  discussions which  ensued  on  the basis of the ·.10:r·ki:r.(;  _t;<::ol>o:- of t::c  Ccr.-a·.-,is::-:ivE~ 
U.;:;~;:•.:dlr.cn;.t:::  failed  to produce  a  joint position.  Denmark 1  France  1  Ireland 
and  the United Kingdom  supported an extension of the  continental shelf 
beyond  200  nautical miles,  coupled with an appropriate income  and 
profit-sharing system;  the  Netherlands and  Belgium  on the other hand 
were  opposed  to  any  such  extension and  remained  committed  to an income 
and  profit-sharing system even within a  200  mile  zone. 
(iii) Conference deliberations  and  the Revised  Single  Negotiating Text 
The  land-locked and  geographically disadvantaged countries,  comprising 
Belgiym1  Japan,  the·  USSR  and  the  other East  European countries opposed 
any  extension of  the continental shelf beyond a  distance of 200  miles 
or'a depth of 500  metres. 
Those  coastal states with a  wide  continental shelf  (United  States, 
Australia,  Norway,  Argentina,  Brazil,  New  Zealand,  Indonesia,  France, 
United  King4om 1  Denmark)  took  the  opposite  standpoint  and  supported a 
proposal  made  by  Ireland in collaboration with  Canada. 
The Irish proposal would  allow states with a  continental  shelf. extending 
beyond  200  miles to fix the  outer limit of  this shelf on the basis of 
one  or other of the  systems described above  (cf. p.  24 7  footnote  2). 
The  proposal  also stipulates that any  ~imits imposed  in this way  by  a - 26-
state should be notified by  the  latter to a  boundaries  commission for 
examination  1• 
The  United  States put  forward  a  specific proposal,  which  had been 
previously drafted,  on  the establishment of an income  and  profit-
sharing system.  This proposal  lays down  that exploitation of 
resources  on  the  continental  shelf beyond  a  200  mile limit would 
involve  the  payment  of a  levy calculated as a  percentage of the  volume 
or value at the place of exploitation of the  extracted products.  The 
levy would  only be  imposed  from  the  sixth year of exploitation.  Its 
rate would be  1%  from the sixth year,  increasing by  1%  until  the  tenth 
year and  remaining fixed at 5%  thereafter.  The  US  proposal does  not 
provide for  any  exemption in the  case  of the developing countries. 
F1nally,  these  contributions would  be  transferred not to the International 
Authority but to regional or international development  organizations 
recognized by the United Nations.  The  proceeds would  be  distributed 
by  these  organizations on  an equitable basis, particular account being 
taken  of the interests and  the  requirements  of developing countries. 
The  US  proposal,  supported by  Sweden,  Norway,  Canada,  India and  New 
Zealand,  failed to obtain the explicit backing of any  Member  State. 
1This  commission would  consist of geologists,  geophysicists or hydrographers. 
When  the  commission considered that the boundaries proposed  conformed  to the 
provisions of ·the  Convention on the  Law  of the  Sea, it would  issue the  state 
concerned with a  certificate finalizing this demarcation and  making it 
legally binding on third countries.  Where  this was  not  the case,  the 
commission would  forward its unfavourable  opinion to the  coastal state which 
would  have  six months  to  submit  a  new  boundary plan.  On  no  account would 
the  comndssion deal with problems  of demarcating the continental shelf between 
adjacent  or opposite states. - 27-
On  the other hand,  the  Netherlands and  Belgium  supported a  proposal 
from  Austria for  an income-sharing system which  would  involve the 
collection of contributions based on the value  or volume  of production 
at the point of operation and  would  be  applicable  to all economic 
activities carried out beyond  a  distance  of 50  miles  or a  depth of 
200  metres.  The  International Authority would  be  the  sole allottee 
of the payments.and would  be  able to grant  exemptions  to developing 
countries. 
Some  states  (Australia,  USSR,  Libya)  expressed  opposition to  any 
incoma-or profit-sharing system. 
The  Revised  Single  Negotiating Text  was  no  different from  the original 
text  as regards the determination of the  outer limit of the continental 
shelf; 'nevertheless,  the  Chairrr1an  of the  Second  Conm:ittee  SU£i:;ested  that 
this question be  studied by  a  group  of experts at  the  next  session. 
With  regard to  income-or profit-sharing,  the Revised  SNT  incorporated 
the  system proposed by the United  States1  but kept  the  monopoly  of the 
International Authority as the receiver and  distributor of the .contribLtions 
It also upheld the International Authority's power  to grant  exemptions 
to the developing countries and  invited the  Authority to take particular 
account,  when  apportioning the  revenue  accruing from  the  contributions, 
of the interests and  needs  of the least advanced  developing countries. 
(iv)  Conclusions  and  proposed guidelines for the next  session of the 
Conference 
In the light of the foregoing,  and  taking into account  the  economic  and 
political interests at stake and  the fact that the  Conference will 
probably accept  an area extending as far as the  Leop!:;ysical  limits of 
the  continental shelf, it would  seem that the  Community  should adopt 
the following  guidelines: 
1But  it does  not  settle the  question of the percentage of the  contributions. - 28 ·-
EEC  Member  States hostile to the principle of extending the continental 
shelf beyond  200  miles  should  come  round to this principlej 
- the  experts of the  Commission  and  the Member  States  should  examine 
more  closely the technical aspects of the various  systems which  may 
be  envisaged for determining the outer limit of the  continental 
shelf,  and  should  study the  relevance  of  the Irish proposal in this 
connection; 
the US  proposal for introducing an income-sharing system should be 
studied in greater detail,  especially in order to determine whether 
the rates proposed as regards national contributions would  be  compatible 
with the prospect of profitable exploitation,  by  EEC  firms,  of the 
resources of the .continental shelf located beyond  the  200  mile limit 
and in particular those which  may  be  contained on the  continental 
shelf surrounding the European territories of the  Member  States 
(particularly the Rockall basin); 
-a fairly open position could be  adopted  on the possibility of allowing 
the  International Authority to grant  the developing countries total 
or partial exemption from  making  contributions; 
-a similar position could be  adopted  on the question as  to whether the 
eontri  but ions  should  be  paid to  the International .Authority and/or to 
development  organizations recognized by the United  Nations. - 29-
One  of the major tasks  of  the Conference  :i.s  to  estnbl h:h  nn  in-tc;:'-
nationa1  rt>cime,  includinG  an Intcrnntionnl Sea-Bed Authority,  ''hich 1-:ill 
re[.;nlnte'· the  exploi  t.ation of the metallic nodu)cs  to be  found  on  the  ocec.~cic 
sea-bed beyond  the limits of nati ono.l  ju::--isdiction.  These  no.dul es 
1  con-
taininG nickel,  copper,  cobclt  nnd mw,r;cmese 1  are  expected to  provide  a 
considcrnblc proportion of the  f.uture  ir.rport  demand  of innustr:io.lized 
l) 
countries 
The  division of opinion  on the  international  sea-bed  item  has  bec:1. 
:primarily on  Horil1-South lines  1  1-:i th  discussions  beins conducted chiefly 
bet.Hcen  the major inuustridi::ci countries  (,·lith  the  Ur:ii.cd  States  pl?.j'i~:.:;­
vcr'J'  muc!'l  a  lcndinc pai'i.)  2
)  on  the  one  side,  and  the lertders  of the  Gro·c1p 
of 11  on  the  other. 
The 1975  SinGle  Ne[;o't:iati.n~  Te:ct  contained. serious deficiencies 
from  i:hc  st?_Yldpoint  of the industrialized stn:tcs.  The  r:it,ht  of e.cccss  to  -t.~;e 
area in  order to Obta.in  m:inerals I  a  funda!llCl1tO}  iSSU('.  for the developed. 
countries,  \·:as  left at the discretion of the Authority.  The  .Authority  \·~<'S 
ernntecl.  1·iide  poHcrs  over  all-.aG.pe·cts  of  sea-bed  exploitation,  incluoj_!1g  -t:~-= 
:p:r;occssing  <Uld  mrtrketinG' of m.:ineralc,  and  a  richt itself to  conduct  direc~: 
operations  1  potentially on  a  monopoly basis. 
Al  thoueh  a  number  of. issuen  remain outstandinp,-,  the Text  produc  sc1. 
. in the light  of the necotiations at the  NeH  York session represents  a 
consider?.ble  improvcr:1cnt  over the earlier version.  'Fne  ma.in  elements  of  the 
present  Text  are set out belm-r. 
l) llhi1c it is difficult to  forecast  ,.1ith  certainty the rate  ancl  volu.".:c  of 
sen-bed. production,  a  recent United Stn.tes  Sen<.cte  report  est:i:;1atcd  the,-: 
by 1990  the  Un:i.tl·d  St<~tc:o  \·:Otilrl1Jc  a.ble  to  repJncc  cntircl:< its prese:!:": 
imports  of nickel  1  copper  <:md  cobalt  (noh'  82 r  LJ. 6  r-md  77  per  ce;
6.t 
respeetiveJy of US  consumption) 1  n.nc  rcrbce  mn..'1c;<:.nesc  jrnportG  fro::1  82 
per cent to 23  per  ccJJt.  ReJ.IOl't  of the  ;,en ate  C:wu:~i ttcc  on  Inh<rior  ~c:·~ 
Inr>ular Affaire  1  Ho.  91j-75!; 1  11).  Jlpril  19761  p.  7.  1!/w.tcvcr the  prccir:c 
!l.Ccur;,.e;y  of  'i:h(:~;c  fiG•.ll:c~: 1  they t:C;rve  to :i.nd:i c:tie  tl~c  potc·n"t} <>.l  r.:cc:.J  c 
of Bc:n.-bcd  production. 
,' 
2 ) ·It m<·Y  he  poin·V:([· out.  i:hcd;  i.i·,c:rc  if.;  ;.t:r-t•il[;  t1o:~,r::-.t:i c  )WCr.:c·.\>rc  :in  ·1..'!18 
Unj -Lctl  ~)tat(:L:  1.6  ;;dO})"i.  lr:::i.~-.J.~::t:) on  \·.'~J 1.~)"0hJ  -LlJI':  u;:~  ~~(:(;r(;t(!'!•;{  oC  thl.~ 
Jntc:r·i.ra··  Hov.1d  be:  n~J·
1 ~.11o·r:L~·-~:.-1  to  1  c;(r!r.r!  1~.~;  OJlCJ".::·\;0~-r·.r  }"">C'.~d~~~c  tli(;  (·;·-t- ... -
jni.o  j"'QI'(~e  or  tl:r;  Lrr.;·.;s.  'J:r-c·r·.:-'::1'."l  )n,:·:  ;:~·-.ll d  'hr~;  ~-V~:·:·J  to ll  c:r;)J~ 1 .-~:  ~1-.;.·_. 
·b,·{  (l(.j!r:·,~.·-.·L·:·i.(:;  ~-:·:;_c;~  ;··-~.":.':·;·  ..  "J:  J~·;·.-:·~.'~]:·1.:~:-.··,. - 30-
(1)  Cnt.0.n-od f'S  o~wr::i:or:-:_.  Acth'ities Hauld be  conducted.  ei  thcr 
by the Authority directly,  thronch  an  ar[:;.?.n  of tho Authority itself  (~tthe 
Entcrprisott ),  or by operators  actine in associn.tion  1·1i th the  Authority  •  .  , 
(a)  Asr~oc:i :1t.rr'l  CJci::ivH:i ~  Hauld be conducted under contracts ui  t.h 
the Authori  t;y  by  States :parties,  state enterpriser;  1  by 
companies  posscssinc; the nn.tion2lit;r of the  spo1~sorinc,- state, 
or by My  eronp of these. It has been  nsswned. thd associ<lted. 
activities ''auld be  carried out  letrGeiy by  internel.tion<:.l 
consortia 3) 
(b) ]2ir0.d  01":·1?r:->ti0n~.  Operdio:!ls by -tho  Authority \·:onld  be  ccr.-
ducted by  a  special  orgnn,  the Enterprise,  Hhich  i·:onld be 
diEtinct  from  the rent of the Authority  nml·h<:we  lccal person-
ality in its o;-m  rir,ht.  All  States part:iesto the Authority 
rlOuld  auto:natic<!ll;-.r be parties to -the Enterprise,  1·1hich  \·:o'J.lcl 
--
be  directecl by  a.- Gover:ning  Boo.rd.  Contracts  \·IOuld  'be  a1:ardec'i 
by the Enterprise on  a  compcti ti  ve basis in order to obt.s.1n  -.::.e 
3)  Three main  consortia have .been  formed  so far: 
(1) 
(2) 
(3) 
Tieeps ea Ventures  (a s:ubsidi ary of Tenneco) 1  t ogcth er 1·1i th 
Jap;mese  firms,  United States Steel,  and Union 1hnierc of  Bel;::~'-'-:-::. 
The  Japanese  firms  are reported to have  dropped  out  <md  Unio:::. 
Minicre has  increr...sed its in-terest.  This is the  only  consori:.j.c:.:.~ 
pl:::..~,ing to cxploi  -t  mwr-;nnese  as  1:ell  as  the other metals  1  'tL'r!cle::-
a  process  developed by Union Hiniere. 
Kennecott  Copper Corp. 1  together ·Hi th fims  fro~ Japr!:!l 
(Mi-tsubishi  10  per ccnt)1  United.  Kinz;do::~  (Rio  Tinto  Zinc  20  f.el' 
cent,  Consolidated Goldfields 10 per cent.) 1  nncl  C<Jn<-do.  (Ho,;c.r,:ir, 
Hines  10 per cent).  'Ync  British firms  have recci  ved  a  ~;ovc~rn-
mcnt  loan of r/,  1.8 m~llion~  . 
In-ternational lhcl:cl Co.  of C;;ma[la,  1-6-t.h  i-ts US  subs:i.dic.ry, 
tor;cther \lith  t.h c  HiH  Cro'J.p  from  the  Fctlcr<!.l  Hcpubl :i.e  of  Gcr::·:<'-r::_; 
(Mcto.1J.r~e~::cll~'chaft  f,G,  Prel,_ssag1  RlH'):i.nische  Bram):ohlcm:c;·~e:, 
;:mc1  f)ali',Gittc::r},  M~l ?..  J'~cp::-.:nc:~c  rro:1p  from  the ;;;wn:ito::JO  co:::~;:,:-:ic~:. 
~'he  three:  grOll.p~;  hr...ve  em  ccrn~l  intc;rcst.  The  f.J.':T1  Gr·u~lp  has 
reccivNl· n.n0..'1Cird  help  fro:n  -l!lC  Fc(lC:rol.  Govcrn:~·!e:~·:·\·  .. - 31-
goods  and services  necessa1~ to exploit sites 4).  ~1e Enter-
prise uould h<wc title to all minerals  and processed  substC'..."1ces 
it procuced,  Hhich  ,.1ould be sold at  in.ternational  r.mrl~et 
prices;  sales to developinG  count_ries, ho\:~cver,  might be at 
bclotv market prices  5) 
(2)  C0nniiicms  of  <'.ccess.  Entities  (other th?..n  the ~nterprisc) 
which  apply for  a  contract for exploration and  eA.11loi tai:ion <Jculd be 
req11ired to r;ubmit  to the Authority either an area large  cnout;h  for half 
of it to  form  a  contract site,  or tHo  areas  of equivalent  si::-,c  cmcl  vclue  • 
.  The Authority chooses  Hhich  hclf of the area (or l·:hich  area)  \·:ill be t!w 
su'bjcct  of the  contrc1Ct  m·mrdcd to the a}lplic;mt  <md  retains the other 
6) 
half (or arc<!.) 
'l'he  areas  retained by the  Authorit;-r are available solely to the 
Enterpr5se,  or to developinG  countries  or to entities sponsored l)y  tJ1C~n 
end.  m10.cr their effective control. 
(3)  )12-.c::i c  C'.on<litL<:::.-'1.:":..".\  nT'osned:iD:-~  e~rnlor::.t:ion  ;:mri  P.~·:~~~· 
Prospecting is  c:!.lloued.  on  a  non-exclusive br'.Sis,  subject to  accept211ce  of 
tne  /mtl~orit;y' s  rules ana  retp.llat.ions.  A request  for  a  contract  for 
exploration cmd  exploitation ·\:ill nor-:r.all;r be grQ.!lted by the Authorii:y1 
subject to co:npliQ.!lce lli  th the relevant :rrocedurcs  a11d  negotiation  of the 
financial  terms.  The  contractor has  security of  exclusive tenure 'of his 
site cmd  >·rill  enjoy a  fair  d~gree of assurance that the tcms under \:hich  J-:c, 
operates l'lill not be  changed Ul1rea:::;onably  during the period of contract.  ?::-:, 
industrialized coUl1tries  have  attO:ched importance to the need that the 
basic operating conditions  should be  contained in the ConvcntioD  or 
roinexed to it 7). 
4)  The principles to 'be  applied by the Enterprise in a'·:<;.rdinr:  contr?.cts  2;:-·s 
(a) non-cliscrimindion as  rcr:;ardc  political  considcr2.tim1s 7  (b)  <'--::'Plic-
ation of r,u.idclines  approved.. _by  the Council Hith  reg2..rd.  to the  p:-:·cfc::c~ce:~ 
to be  c.ccordcd to goods  an.c1  services  orig:i.l~ating in dovel op:ing  countri  c::o. 
Jmncx II,  St<:1.tute  of the Enterprise,  par~t,<;rc:!.ph  7  (d),  fc:.rt  I,  ;-;;:;~:':.'. 
5)  ilnncx JI, 
6)  l11U1CX  1 1  fl::tT't'..{;I'<~}Jh  8  (d) 1  Fart  I,  i~;'3ci'I'. 
7) 
ProrJo:::~J.lro~  for r)cisic  con,lit:iong Here  nr>.rlc  <J.t  the  Ca:r;:c:;s  sc~:~,:JO~l  h;r ·t>:c: 
United.  ~it:->.tc::;,  .TaJ!c'.l1  v.nd  Co::>:~:unii~r  ~~·Lo:h•.:;  (C>:,:ccr:t  Ircl~J1r1)j  <:.ml  i~1 19'!5 
by t1:r.  u;;~,:;r~f  G.;;  ,,c}l  2.:;  1' 1 ~!  the  Grvl:})  of'  77. - 32-
(4)  RrP.o\l':'CP.  1'01 :i c:v.  '1\:.o  interlockinG is:::ncs  \>'ere  invol,•ed. un:ler 
this hcucli11r,:  the need. to  establish in the.Convcntion the  over.?.ll  ro.te  e_t 
which  the  nreLl.  mit,)lt  be developed;  nnd  meo.surcs  to protect the interests of  .. 
developing countries  Hhich  are ln-"1d  prodacers  of the minerals.  'l'l:c  solutio:-! 
prop  or:; cd  consists of these parts 8). 
(o.)  During  cm  interim ·'l?eriod  of 20  yearn  (possibly extended to. 
25 years) totnl proouction  from  the  area is not to  exceed  t~e 
projected increase in dc:nnnd  for nickel,  set at at least 
6 ·ver cent per annum. 
(b)  Efforts arc to be made  to  conclude  co:nmodi ty  arrf!.;•:g-cr1ents  o:~ 
agrce:::1ents  for all four  r~i:wrr.ls  nnd  in '·1hich  all  affected 
parties  p::lrticipL~.te.  The  Authoi'ity Hould  be  entitleD. to 
(c) 
-· 
become  a  pari;)'  to  such  arr211GCments  or <:grecments  in respect 
of production  fro:n  the area.  Production  controls  over ·cont::--c::.c":: 
could only be  exercised by the Authori  i:.y  pursuant  to decisi  c::-,2 
token 1·1i thi11 the  franJC\·JOl'k  of these  arra!1[;Cments  or  a.grce::Jcn~ s. 
CoJJpensn.tory  financial  adjustment  assistance is to be pro-
vided in  respe~t o( developing producers  \·.'hich  suffer a 
su.bstcmtial  decline in  ex:port  en.rnincc  thronc)1  sea-becl  p:c·o-
~uction.  Alth0\1f,h nickel  and  copper llill be the mP.in  minerals 
for \':hich 11odules 1rill be  e;...!Jloi ted,  the qmmtities,  as  a 
percentage of  ~wrld demand Hill be relatively t'::Jall  and no 
great effect  on prices  :i;n  respect  of these h;o minerals  is 
expected. It is generally a{;'reed  hO\-JCVer  that  cobnl  t  prices 
vlill be influenced by  sea-bed production.  This  ir-;,  hm1ever, 
economically the least sicnificant of the four mi:nerr.ls  9:. 
l~iane211ese is an uncertain  ce>..se  since it ic not  clear HhG.t 
the volume  of SC2.-bed  procluction  Of this metal  HiJ.l  be. 
B)  Article 97  ])aragraph  ~ 1  Far~ I,  HSI-IT. 
9)  Z<J.irc  is the rno..in  -producer  of col:1alt  (1:hjcl1  is a  lWJWOcluct  of  COfit)C;r 
'extraction  frcll~  r-ertain depos:its)  LUltl  \·JOnlrl  be  the mnin  develo!)ill~; 
country  affcc~t  cd. - 33-
( 5)  Stn1  ct.': rC'  ~'1i'l  r1 C'r: :\:-1  0n-T1~~  ~~~ ::;:_}'1'0Cf'f:f' f'S:  of  "\·.'to "-L~:j  t;-_:~ 
The  Jnternation;tl  Sc~-Bcd Authority is  cr1\'is::t::;cd  <CS. u  bod;>r  on  2.  conci(:cr.:>--~'lc 
scale,  h~v:ing nn  Asse:7l'bl;y 1  n.  Council,  n.  r<'Jlc,e  of  spcciali~ed co::-t.-r.issions, 
the Entcrprir;c 1  n.  sccretru'iat  and  a  Tribun2l.  'l'hc  principal questions  hr,ye 
been the distrilmtion of powers  bct,,·ccn the Assembly  nnd  the C01mcil 1  ;md  "c!'-:2 
composition  m1d  decision-makinc process of the Council, 
·. 
Uncler  tho  Revised Sin,slc  Ji"q;otiatin~ Te::o..--t  the  Assembly  Hould 'be 
empmwrecl to  estn.1.>lich  cenernl  policy.  The Council,  hO\Hovcr,  ,.:ould  P.l:::o  1.>e 
nuthori7.ccl to  tr\.ke  policy decisions  (inclurlinc the  issuin;; of r,cncr;:.l 
pol:ic:;c  directives to the Bn·terprisc),  <L"d  be  responsible  for  the  execntic:1 
of the Jmt.horit;y 1s  pov:ers  as  regards the  a:-:ard  of  contracts  a.11cl  the  udoptio~: 
of I'llles  2-Yld  rcr,-ulation;_;. 
As  rct;<~-rds  tl1c  co:npoEitiOll  of tl1c  Council,  t!1c  developed states 
have pressccl for  a  s~'stc;n c:herel';>'  mc~lbership \·:oulcl  be  bnserl on represent-
ation of· interest  ~;roups  ( oper~to:r states  1  land producers  1  consUI'lcrs  1  1~6.­
locked  ;mel  cco~;raphicnll;y  clisc.d\'2.nt~!GCd  states etc.)  1  a  majol'i ty bcil1g 
reqnix·cd  ill  each  r;rOU.!)  for decisions.  An  approach  on  these lines,  it  Y.~?~ 
fel  t 1  \Wnld  reduce the  d<L'!SCr  thcd  the Council  11oulcl  adopt  decisions  tc11di1:~: 
to limit ac:tivities in the area;  The 1975 Single Her:otiatin·g Text  reflected. 
the notion of interest  Groups 1  or  1 collec:es  1 ,  at lcnst in part  1  in pro-
vic1ing for  a  Conncil  of  )6 wcmbcrs,  24  being elected on  a  bo.sis  of 
equ.:itabl c  geoc;raphi  cc:'.l  representation  und  t,,·el  ve  chosen  according to 
'interest group'  criteria,  six of these  coming  from  developed states  and 
six from  developing countries ·lo). Decisions  Hould _req11ire  a  tHo-thirds  plu:-; 
<lne  majori  t;y.  Since there  \-.'aS  insufficient  ti10e to discuss the matter,  the 
1976  Text  reproduces  the article put  fon-:ard in 1975  ,,1ithout  chnnge. 
lO)  Article 27 1  Sin[;le  Ne~otir.t:inr; 'l'ext.  The  six devc1oped  countries  1-:ould 
be  chosen  fro;n  those  ~~i th  ~,u-o;-~tc:mtic:l  invcstr.1cnt  in  1  or pos::;c::;sinc, 
a.dv::mcccl  tcchnolc,c:;r "tl_sed  fcr 1  the  ex~)Jorat:io11  a.YJo.  explo:i.te1tion  of the 
area,  ~mel major r:lincral  importers,  provided  at least one  co::1cs  {rom 
the Eadern L'uropca.ll  rP.g:ion. 
The six ml!ml)crs  from  the dcvdop:iDG  cmmtr:i ec.  110nJ.d  consist  of  one  fro:~: 
each  of tho  fol1 01-:inc  cnt  cc;orj e:::  lancl-1)asc:d  m:i 11er:J.  export  c;r:o.;  :i::1~10!'-'.: c:·?: 
c'\.a;lc::;  '·::i'Lh  <L  1:-:.,_'gC  popnL~.ticm;  };:mc:-loc}~c:rl  sLatP.r~;  ccogrr~nhic:nlly c3.iE-
a.dvm1'lD,SCll  r;tatcc:;  rmd  lc,~:-;-t  dcve:1oJ)c:rl  d:2-tc:::. - 34-
For the first time  durinc:; the Conference it proved.  possible  fo:::-
common  s'tatemcnts to be  mncl.e  on behalf of  Co'l'J~mi  ty States  on  a  series  0 : 
sen-bed issues:  the cateGories  of operators  (article 22),  resource  poJ.ic~,· 
(article 9),  the ])O\·:ers  a..'1d  functions  of the Council  (nrticle 28),  and 
marine scientific researcl1 (article 10).  In P.dtiition  nrrPJ1[;'ementn  \·:ere 
made to coordinate vim·m  so far as  possible and  to  avoid  open  disa;ree:-::e!1"': 
where  co::1pletc identity of  011inions  could not be reached;  the Presidcnc:; 
bcce  .. me  inereasing1y accepted  as the "intcrlocutcnr va1able11  a11d  rep!.'CSC':::-t-· 
.ati  ve of the Co:::r.n.mi ty for the purposes  of rneeti11[;'S  held under the  auE'pi  c.~, 
of the. Ghairm2.11. 
That beillt:;  sa_icl 1  tho difficulties in makine proc;ress  at Co:n!:-nmi -t;,· 
lev!';)  rem;"Jin  con~it1crL!.b1c.  Those  cl.j.ffi011lties  stem  from  a  number  of  cr.c:Jsr~:: 
n  tendency for e::--.!Jerts  to be unable to r;et  neH  instn1ctions  on  the basis  o: 
Coiil.lTil.lni ty dit:cussions  alone,  l:hich mc211s  that the Go::lllmnit;y  is often  1'!.~-,2..:_'~ e 
to  spe2.k ,,,ith  a  sin~J.e voice at the outset of the discussions,  aJ1d  the''' 
when neH instru.ctions have been  obtainc6.1  for Co:nmuni ty coordination to  12._::: 
behind the speed of tl1e  Conference;  relucta'1ce  on  the ])art  of 1·icmber  St2.~.;cs 
l'lhich have taken prrrt  in ner;,otiations  in restricted mcetinc-s  to lose tllei:-
special status by  at:;reein~ to  Co:n.n:uTli t;l'  st2.temcnts;  differenccc  in  e:-::phii:i::: 
among J.Icmbcr  States  (those  for  \·:hom  the topic has  no  direct  implicntions 
have  a  more  'tl1ircl Horlc1'  approach  tha..'1  the others)  and  differences in 
interests betHcon those 11hose  co:npruJ.ies  l1ave  joined  consortj_a  and those 
l·lhich have not  done  so. 
iii) N  <=J.i n  Oni:st~nn  in"  1~.::-ucs  n~1d?  ·  ·::  :-:· ;; d~  nr.;.  e:·:"~ co.:·.:. c1: l~  for  tl·: c  L'  ..  '~~t  .  ..,__  .... ·- ... ~---~.....----.. ~-;....-.... _....~--·--....-"'>-.' ----
i>~~.:~~j_',;l'l  c<£'  Ll~c.:  Cc·r:.~·~_:_l_-s-~~l·:::c:  ----------
The results  achieved in the Revised Single Negotiating Text  in 
defining the r.eneral  provisionc  of the international  regime  (article:..;  1  ·- J.:. 
in esta"bJ.ishing th.e  cateGories  of operators  and their opera.tionnl! conditions 
(mmcx I), the structure of the J,uthority7  and the basic resource "ROl:i.c;;r 1 
seer:~  acceptable,  in bron_cl:tcrms at least;  to the  Jc">•slo.~-,-..  ~l 
co u.r:rt :ci  cr~ ..  lihilc -the  devdopctl countries  sbn".J.1cl  be 
prcpn.1~ccl to resist  2.ttcrr.ptc  to move  the  Tc)::i:  b8.ck  in i:hc  dircctj_on  of  -t::.e 
the Comrmm:i:t;r  ~>tatc:s  ;;;nang  thr:m,  11Dl  )H:ccl  ·to  sccl:- to  clr1rify  O:(  iJ:1:Y!'C:·\'C 
tl1c  Jlcvi::;cu  'J'c:xt. - 35-
Junongst  such  points m::w  be noted the  arnbiGtli tJ' of the dcfini  tion of 
"activit.·:i. cs in the  Arcn.".  'l'he  exi::;tinL"",  defini-tion ll)  ~s  "' ....  ·  t  ~  ~·  1~provc~crr  ever 
the 1975.Tcxt in that it·is linited to  c...xploration  for,  and  exploitation of, 
i.he  rc::;O\irccs  of the urea,  a  definition \-111ich,._in  the Co:mnittcc's  dis-
cussions,  hns  nor.;J<Jlly been  rer,nrdcd as mc<ming that the poHcrs  of the 
.Aut11orii.;r ,,•ould not  extend to the transport,  proce:::sin,:;  and  markctin.:, of 
.  12)  . 
the four metals.  The matter is ncvcrthe1ess not  cntireJ.:v  clear  a."ld  -!;!:.e 
draft statute of the Enterprise Hould  cllou that orcan to  conduct  ull 
opcrat:i ons,. includill[; process:i.nG  a.11d  1:1a:rkcting. It·  is.  sugc;estecl that 
J.lember  Str:.tc::.;  r:hould  su·pport  tlw vieH  i;ho:t  tlle  L.,··~·~·t  cod!'c:::.  cf  '[,.2 
At-tention at -the next Session is J.ikcly to be  concen·Lrated  on 
those isf·u.cs  \·1hich  x·c:nai11  outstcmdi11[:';  6r 1:hicl1  have not  so  f<.<.l'  been  clo::e:..-.-
cx~-nin  cd;  texts  co11ccrnin,; i.h e  finvnci <:l  a.rr2.nr;m~E'n-ts  of 'operators  1  the 
stn:\;u.te  of the J:ntP.rprise  nnd  the  clispuips ·.settlement  proceJ.urc  \·Jere  i1-,C.ce~ 
only put  fon1a:rd  for the first time  at the NcH  York  session.  11.  swnma:ry  of 
the main  outstanrlir.['.·  jtcrns  21:d  the approrrch to them  c:h:i.chl  it is  sut:r;cstP:l, 
should be follO\ICd;  i:  sr~~  C'.d  l;dO>i. 
(1)  Xb.£;_!2~::-:.£•  The  notion of the Enterprise,  nornoly  an 
opcra.tional  arm  of the  Jmt1writ;-{1  abJ.c to  engage in ex:ploitation activj:tie2 1 
enjoys very \·Jidcsprcw support  at the Conference.  The  proposal  itself \·:a.s 
put fon·ard by -the  Group  of 77  wd has been accepted by the United Stn.tes, 
Japan  211d  the USSR.  It has not bce11  possible for Comr.mni t;r Sto.tes to tcl:e 
a  commun  posi-tion on the issne ho1wver,  OHing  -to  the vie;!s  of  one Her:•bc:--
State \'lhich  has  ar[.,uod  t11at  the  cBto:blizh:nsnt  of the Enterprise as  a 
separate orc:nn is l.Uillccessary  t  al  ihouc;h  other J.iember  States  arc prepe.:rcd. 
to agree to  L~ Enterprise. 
11)  Article 1  (:ii) 1  P.J.rt.  I,  HS'i?r. 
12)  Sec  par;;r,-rap11s  10  ;:m(l  J.J.  of the  :i.ntrorluctor;y note b:t the  Ch2:ir.~;m  oi"  ·,!·.•.: 
Fj_r:-3t  Gommittce; 1  ;·:·::::~:L  I,~<~~:-~~<. - 36-
In view of the  support  the Enterprise proposal has  received at the 
Conference  and the consideration that, if the Enterprise is not  made 
a  separate organ,  with a  distinct status,  this  m~ lead to pressure for 
it (or the Authority) to be given greater, if ill-defined,  powers 
vis-a-vis other operators,  it is recommended  that Member  States should 
agree to the principle of the Enterprise. 
As  regards the draft statute of the Enterprise  (Annex  I  of Part  I 1  RSNT) 1 
a  detailed examination of the various points raised will be  required at 
expert  level.  TrJi th respect to the proposals in the Statute that the 
devel~ping countries  should be given certain advantages  by the Enterprise, 
it m~  be  recalled that it is already suggested in the  Revised Text  that 
the developing countries should be  in a  privileged position as  regards  access 
to the areas  reserved to the Authority,  and the Enterprise  ~1ould itself 
be  established in response to the  demands  of such countries.  It, therefore, 
appears  unjustified that they should be specially favoured in the operation 
of the Enterprise;  this organ should so  far  as  possible conduct  its activities 
on  the  same  basis  as  other operators.  It is proposed that the position 
to be taken vis-a-vis the operations  of the Enterprise  and the related problems 
should be governed by the following guidelines: 
The  activities of the Enterprise should be  conducted on  commercial 
principles. 
The  proposal that  the Enterprise  (or the Authority itself) should be 
permitted to sell minerals  at  discriminatory prices should be  opposed. 
This  issue raises  a  difficult question of principle which  cannot  be 
admitted. 
- The  developing coUntries should receive the preponderant  share of the 
profits accruing to the Authority and to the Enterprise frJm  sea-bed 
exploitation.  Efforts should also be  made  to  see  what  other possibilities 
could be  found to take  account  of their special needs.  Th·~ proposal 
that  developing countries might  be  given advantage  in the  av;ard  of 
contracts by the Enterprise should,  however,  be  treated with caution. 
The  proposed immunity of the Enterprise from-taxation  and customs  duties 
(paragraph 9(i)) 1  would provide the Enterprise with  a  considerable 
advantage  over other operators  and  should accordingly be  opposed.  The 
Conununity  v;ould  for its part  also have to  examine  the  issue in terms 
of its implications  as  regards  the obligations  and procedures of the 
General  Agreement  on  Trade  and Tariffs  (GATT)  as "l'i'ell  as  the operations 
of the  Generalised System of Preferences.  Although it is normal  for 
intergovernmental  bodies  exercising public functions  to be  exempt  from 
taxation and  customs  duties,  the International Sea-Bed Authority,  of 
which the Enterprise would be  an  organ,  would have  powers  over the 
exploitation of a  large  area and might  be directly responsible for the 
production of a  considerable volume  of minerals.  The  matter cannot  be 
treated therefore solely as  an  issue relating to immunities  in the - 37-
usual  sense.  ~e  rules of oriein with respect to sea-bed minerals  would in any 
ease have to be set by the Community  and not by Member  States.  (~e~ -~ 
Appendix to this Annex). 
(2)  Co!Troositfon  of the Council  (and of the Governing Board of the 
.  .  are composed  · 
·Enterprise,  assuming that;  as now  proposed,  the two  bodies/aqcording to 
the same  criteria).  The  discussions  so far have proceeded  on  the  assumptio::l 
that two or three lvlember States 'vould be represented in the •top'  categOT"J 
as  1o:perator1  or  1ir.rporter'  States,  and  that others '.zould  have  a  chance  of 
representation either as  member  of other interest groups  (if other  catec.orie~ 
were i'lltroduced), or.  as  membS::rs  of the  'Hestern European and Others'  Gro'.lp. 
},;!·  advantage ..  attributed to this  approach  . is that it could give 
Member States between three and five places  out  of a  36  Member CounciL 
The  disadvantage would be that Member  States 'V10uld  be placed in different 
categories so that it would be difficult, particularly if fUrther interest 
grou:p  representation were  introduc~d, to ensure that the Community  spoke 
_!'~~-=-~tit~~~ was  thus  able to make its influence' felt. RoN,  in any 
case,  would it be  decided which three or two Member States would be eligible 
for the  11op'  category?  Coul~ they all be  sure of holdin~ their place over 
the long term? As  regards the specific issue of voting,  the Council,  like 
other organs of the Authority,  "Till in all probability endeavour to 1-1ork 
by consensus. Even if there were to be  a  vote,  a  vote  on behalf of the 
Community or of its  __  li!~!!l.~~  s~.ate:s  C()llectiyely wouldh§!.vemore.impact 
__  t_!laf!-_ C!:  __ series of votes cast  separately.·. 
It woUld therefore be in the interests of· the Cornnnmi ty and its 
Member States to seek to provide that the -category of major industrialit:ed 
powers  should include ·'a' member  representing the European Economic 
Community  •  This would not  only  comply l·Tith  the  reference in the present 
text of article 27 to major importers  of the four metals, but  give the 
CoilliDU.n5.ty  :parity with the United States  and the USSR  (1-1hich  the l~E:mber 
States, -taken l§eparately,  cannot  achieve).  The  Hey in ,-lhicb tbis Community 
seat would. be organized would be  an internal matter. In principle the-re 1-:ould 
be one delegation in which all llcmber Staten  \-rould  have the opportunity to 
be represented,  statements being normally made by the State exercisinc the 
Pr-esidency of the Council  of 1-Hniders.  Individual J.lember  States l-TOI1ld - 38-
have the assurance that they could be represented at all times  : .. that 
-on issues On  which  they had a  parliCillar interest t.heir views  liOUld  be 
given due  attention by other parties to the Convention. 
_____  This·  pro~os_al  __ offers wha-t» is considered to be the best way 
of dealing l<li th the particular problems posed,  in a  manner which \vould 
combine  political weight'· for tl)..e  vieus expressed and  flexib~lity in 
organization at Community level. 
(3)  Financi~~ Arr?nrcements 
(a) Fina.nce  of the  Jmthorit~.r.  The previous articles  ha~e been 
Part  I  RSNTJ 
retained \·d th little change  (articles 46  - 5Ji. Member  States 
·should continue to advocate that the Authority should in 
principle be self-supporting,  receiving obligatory contribut-
ions only in respect of administrative·,  non-operational, 
axpenses  during the initial period. 
(b)  Fin?~ce of the Enternrise. ·Th~ general line .supported by 
--
. Member  States,  that contributions by State.s to the Enterprise 
should be volun.tary,  not obligatory,  should be maintained.  The 
Enterprise would be financed by funds  made  available by the 
Authority,  as these accumulated,  through raising loans,  and 
by the amounts  offered by contractors  supplyin~ goods  and 
services. 
(o) Financial  arr~ml!ements ,.nth  resnect to contractors  (annex I, 
paragraph 9  (d)  and Special appendix to the  RSNT).  ··,  \  ·.  -
The  two  approaches set out  in the Speci?I 
Appendix wi11  need expert  study in order to.  deterrline vrhich 
system  (or any further· variant) v10uld  be in the best interest 
of Community  operators.  Under both systems the operator 
would be all0\·7ed to recover his costs and to retain a·share 
,of the profits. - 39-
(4)  Anti-Mononolv  or Antj-Tiomin?.nt  PoRition ClsnRe.  The  Member 
States agreed during the Caracas  session on the need for an  anti-monopoly 
or. anti-,dominnnt position clause,  the object of which  t.zould  be to prevent 
'  .  . 
any one state from  gaining an undue advantage.  The  USSR  and Japan took a 
similar line.  The United States however has strongly opposed the inclusion 
of a  clause of this tyPe,  ar~ting that,  since there are hundreds  of 
mining sites, no  one state could exhaust  them all,  and that the clause, 
if inserted,  could be used to limit production. 
The matter is amongst  the issues to be decided at the next 
·session 13).  As~ing- that it is impossible to resolve the question of  t1~e 
number of  si~es (on l-:hich  experts hold different viet·:s)  in a  definitive 
way,  it is recommended that Nember  States should seek to establish a  meens 
of preyenting the creation of monopoly  or dominant  positions  • 
.{5)  Provisional annlication of the Comrention  (article 63)  l4)  ~ 
The United States has attached importance to the need that the Convention 
should enter into force provisionally,  1Yi thout Hai  ting for the bulk of 
ratifications,  in order to avoid  a  halt in the rhythm  of investments. 
-- •. 
The  majority of states at the Conference appear to be  prepared 
to accept provisional application,  provided the terms  of the Convention 
-ar~ satisfactory,  but have stressed that the issue is bound up with the 
provisional  application of the treaty as  a  Ttrhole  (i.e. not  only as  regards 
the sea--bed but with regard to the  economic 'zone also).  Amongst  Member 
·States,  some  have  drmm attention to constitutional problems  which  could 
arise if the c'envention  entered into force provision-ally  before their 
legislative body had approved the text. 
l3) Annex I,  paragraph 8  (e) ,  Po.rt  I 1  llstJT. 
,.  ·.ro  •• 
l4)  ~i; is amongst  the articles continued unchanged  from  the 1975  Tex-t. - 40-
So  far as the international  sea~bed area_  is concerned,  it is recommended that,  subject 
to constitutional considerations, Member  States should agree in principle 
to provisional application.  The  number of notifications required of 
' 
signatories tdlline to apply the Convention on  a  provisional basis should 'be 
;.ncrea.sed hol-1ever  from  36,  as not-.7  proposed,  to one third of the potential 
signatories,  and provisional application of the international  sea-bed 
regime should not start until two years after the instrument .had been 
opened for signature;  or provisional application  co.ul~ start once half of 
the potential :.it:,n.:..tories  h<;.ve  notifiad ;;illint:.ness t-;i:thout  waiting two  years. 
(6)  Dispute  set~~emen~  p~~c-~dll!'~~- Cann::x.  ~~I of ~art I,_ ~~T_). -- I~Iember .States 
should continue to support. the approach  taken in the present draft,  ,.1hereb:r 
the possibility of proceedings before a  permanent tribunal is combined ,.ri th 
recourse to special  cha~bers (in effect  ad hoc  arbitral bodies),  at the 
choice of the parties involved in the dispute.  Further attention should 
be given  hot~ever at  expert level to the problems  posed by the existence 
of tt-lO  sets of disputes settlement bodies and the pot·!ers  of the tribunal 
to examine decisions given by special  chambers. - 41-
4.  Protection of the marine  environment 
a. Dumping  of harmful  substances 
(i)  Single  Negotiating  Text and discussion at the 
Conference 
When  the  texts  on  dumping  were  examined,  the  develo-
ping countries  gave  evidence  of minimalist attitudes, 
first of all by  proposing that the coastal States with 
powers  to lay down  rules  on this subject should  not 
be  required to comply with the  rules and  standards 
generally accepted at international level - i.e. those 
of the  London  Convention of  1972  on dumping  - but 
should merely take  them into account,  which  would 
give  them much  greater flexibility and enable  them 
in particular to adopt  less  stringent regulations. 
Most  of these  States are  not  parties to the  London 
Convention of  1972  nor  to the  regional Conventions 
of Oslo,  Helsinki or  Barcelona  and wish to avoid 
being bound by these  Conventions. 
Certain developing countries and coastal States 
such as  canada  and Australia wished  moreover  to 
grant to the  coastal State  powers  not  only in its 
200 mile  economic  zone  but also in the  superjacent 
waters  extending to the  outer limit'of the continental 
shelf where  that limit went  beyond  200 miles  (which 
would  imply a  substantial extension of ocean areas 
for  some  countries). 
Finally,  the  rest of the  ocean covering the  inter-
nationai sea-bed  zone  would,  according to the 
developing countries  proposal,  be  subject to the 
International sea-bed Authority as  regards questions 
of  d~mping.  (This  proposal also raised a  point of 
procedure  :  is the  Third  Committee,  which  is competent 
to deal with  sources  of pollution in any  zone, 
nevertheless entitled to grant  powers  to the 
International sea-bed Authority which  falls  solely 
within the  purview of the  First Committee  ?) • 
The  plenary working  group then examined  a  number  of 
new  texts drawn  up as  a  compromise  solution on  the 
basis of consultations held by  the  Chairman  in 
restricted working  groups ..  It was  not hov1ever  possible 
to reach an  agreement  because  of the  position adopted 
by  the  developing countries,  which  demanded  that no 
reference  be  made  to international conventions 
already  drawn  up  (in this case  the  London  Convention 
of  1972  on dumping)  in the .wording  of the  provision 
imposing  on  States  the  joint obligation of  introducing 
international rules  and  standards.  The  desire  of 
developing countries  not to be  bound  individually by 
this Convention is  reflected in their wish to establish 
new  international rules  wh  ~ r'h  "''""',A  'ho  1 <>QQ  ,::::rri nnP.nt-. 
in their regard. - 42-
The  working  group also examined  in plenary session the 
provisions  of the  Single  Negotiating Text  relating to the 
international responsibility of States. This matter posed 
no  serious  problems. 
(ii)  Community  coordination 
The  Member  States.  examined  proposals to grant to the 
coastal State  the  power to lay down  rules  governing  dumping 
and  the  power  to control it  (police  powers.)  in the  economic 
zone  and  on those  parts of the continental shelf extending 
beyond  the  economic  zone. 
Some  Member  States wished to extend  to 'the  continental 
shelf all the  rights exercised by coastal States  in the 
economic  zone;  other  Member  States wished to limit such an 
extension merely to the  right to  lay down  rules. 
The  Hember  States also examined  the  proposal of the 
Netherlands  Delegation according to which coastal States 
must  ent.er  into consultation with other coastal States  which, 
because  of their geogLaphical situation,  might  be  affected 
by  dumping. 
(iii)  Revised Single  Negotiating text and  proposed guidelines 
for  the  next .session of the  Conference 
As  regards  dumping,  the  Revised Single  Negotiating Text 
merely provides  for  general undertakings,  particularly 
on  the question of international coordination and entrusts 
the  coastal State with the  task of controlling pollution 
by  dumping  in its economic  zone. 
It is proposed that the  Community and  its Member  States 
adopt  common  positions  in order to ensure  the  coherent 
implementation of  commitments  to be  entered  into in the 
Convention and of those  undertaken  by  the  Member  States 
in the  framework  of the execution of the  Community's 
environment  programme. ';""  43-
b.  Pollution from  shipping 
(i)  Sing-le Neg'otiating .Text  and discussion at the  Conference 
The  question of pollution from vessels was  not  a  subject of discussion 
during previous  sessions .within the official organs  of the  Conference 
but  was  examined by parallel working  groups.  The  Single Negotiating 
Text  was  drawn  up  largely on  the baiis of an unofficial  document 
prepared by the French Delegation  wit~ the  aim  of reaching a  compromise 
between the rights of coastal States  and those of flag States. 
In the general  debate,  the representatives of the  developing countries 
and those of certain coastal States  (e.g.  Canada,  Australia and New 
Zealand)  were  of the  opinion that this text  was  not  satisfactory and  did 
not  sufficiently take into  account  the interests of coastal States 
in safeguarding their environment.  They  emphasized the right  of coastal 
States to  apply  in their territorial waters stricter n~tional regulations 
than the generally accepted international standards  and rules,  even in 
respect  of the design,  construction,  manning  or  equipment  of vessels, 
whereas  the  delegations of the maritime  powers,  with the  exception of 
the United States,  considered that  such ·rules  did not  fall -v;ithin the 
competence  of coastal States as  regards  foreign vessels in their 
territorial Haters  and that their application would  interfere 'tli th the 
exercise of the right  of innocent  passage.  The  provision of Part  II 
of the  Single Negotiating Text  v1hich  define this matter expressly 
exclude  such national regulations. 
The  delegations  of most  of the maritime pm.,rers  vJere  somewhat  cautious 
as  rega.rds  the  powers  which  might  be granted to Member  States in the 
economic  zone  beyond territorial waters.  Some  delegations  of maritime 
powers  felt thp,t  these pov'lers  should be  exercised only in a  50  mile 
zone  (corresponding to  the  area where  any  discharge of hydrocarbons  is 
prohibited pursuant to the  London  Convention of 1973  on the prevention 
of pollution). 
After this general  debate,  the plenary Norking  group  decided,  on  a 
proposal  from  its Chairman  to  adjourn to  enable its Chairman  to have 
informal talks.  The  Single Negotiating Text  vms  still the basic  docwoent 
but it was  agreed that  other important  problems  could aJ12o  be  discussed. - 44-
As  regards  the coastal State's powers  to apply regulations in 
t_erri  to  rial waters  1  the delegations of the maritime po-v1ers  held 
that there must  be  a  formal  clause preventing the coastal State 
from  imposing conditions governing design,  construction,  equipment 
and manning  on  foreign vessels moving  through its territorial waters. 
The  delegations of the coastal States emphatically refused to  consider 
such  a  provision. 
There  was  another difference of  op~n~on between the delegations of the 
maritime powers  and those. of the coastal States,  including the 
developing countries and  States  su~h as  Canada,  Australia,  New  Zealand 
and  Spain,  on the question of the coastal State's power to  apply 
regulations in its economic  zone.  vJhereas  on  the subject  of 
pollution by vessels the  delegations of the coastal States wanted 
the coastal State to have the pO\'Ier  to  apply regulations throughout 
its economic  zone,  the delegations of the maritime  powers  were  prepared 
to  gr3r~ such powers  to the coastal State only within a  fifty-mile 
zone.  They  also  attempted to  limit these powers  to infringements 
relating to waste v1hile  the delegations of coastal States considered 
that  a  coastal State should be  able to apply all the international 
regulations in its economic  zone  (even where  that  coastal State was 
not  a  party to the international Conventions  in question)  and that it 
should have the right to  stop vessels in its economic  zohe  and to board 
them in order to  apply these rules.  Nevertheless the coastal States 
conceded that this power  should be  exercised only in exceptional  cases 
of serious  infringements  and  extensive  damage  or risks  of such  damage. 
The  delegations of the maritime powers  were  unable to  accept  911y  such 
extension of  authority~  Some  of these delegations  recognized  · pov1ers 
to institute legal proceedings  only where  the flag State had failed 
to take  any  action -v;ithin  several  months  ofthe date  on  which  the 
offence was  reported. 
Neverthelet>S 1  most  of the  delegations of the maritime  po\11ers  and the 
coastal States agreed that the coastal State of the port  of destination 
(or port of call) of the vessel  should have the power  to carry out  an - 45-
inspection at the request  of the  injured coastal State.  The 
delegations of the United States,  Canada and Australia declared 
themselves  in favour of the power of the  coastal State to institute 
legal proceedings in respect  of infringements  committed on the high 
seas,  or in territorial waters or the  economic  zone  of a  coastal 
State. 
Several  delegations of maritime  powers  attempted to obtain a  certain 
number of safeguards or guarantees  in favour  of the  flag State (for 
example the right  of priority in instituting proceedings,  the right 
to have the vessel released immediately against  a  security,  an 
assurance that  only monetary penalties. will be applied and that  no 
action would be taken v1hich  could constitute a  danger to  shipping, 
(etc.). 
It was  generally conceded that  the State in whose  port  a  ship was  lying 
could take measures to prevent  that  ship  from  leaving port  or compel 
it to make  the necessary repairs if it constituted. a  serious  danger 
to navigation or the  environment. 
The  delegations  of the coastal  States  were  opposed to the rights 
of the flag State to have priority in instituting proceedings  in 
respect  of infringements  committed in the  economic  zone  of a  coastal 
State  and so  established by that  State. 
Most  of the  delegations  of the  maritime  powers  1  vii  th exception of the 
United States,  v1ere  basically in favour of more  extensive  poviers  for 
the port  State; - 46-
(ii)  Community.coordination 
The  Member  States mainly discussed the problems  relating to the 
Articles concerning pollution of the sea by vessels.  They  adopted the 
principle of a  definition of special  zones to be  established at 
international level  and also  examined proposals  from  the United Kingdom 
Delegation. 
This  delegation proposed that the following powers ·be  granted to the 
coastal State: 
as the port  State,  pmvers  governing ships which  enter voluntarily 
into  one  of its ports  in respect  of any  waste  dumped  in its 
exclusive  economic  zone  in violation of generally accepted 
international  rules; 
- as  the coastal State,  full  power  to  stop,  board,  inspect,  take  into 
port  and institute proceedings  in respect  of ships  in an  area of 
fifty miles; 
(i)  if there has  been  a  violation of international  rules  and if 
there is a  threat of serious  damage; 
(ii) if the violation was  discovered immediately or shortly after 
being committed and if its discovery constitutes obvious  proof 
of the violation. 
The  Danish Delegation,  for its part 1  stated that it could not 
accept  the application of design standards in its territorial 
waters  nor the right of the coastal State to  arrest  ships in 
its economic  zone.  The  Irish Delegation,  however,  was  in favour 
of full powers  of the coastal States with regard to the 
application of rules  and  regulations  on  the  dumping  of 1-1aste  in 
the  200-mile  zone.  These  powers  would  include the right to 
stop ships. 
Nevertheless,  all the Member  States agreed on  the need to limit 
the powers  of the coastal State in the  economic  zone. -47-
(iii) Revised Single Negotiating Text 
It is clear from  the  Revised Single Negotiating Text  that the regime 
applicable to the exclusive  economic  zone  is neither that of the 
high seas nor that of the territorial sea,  but  relates to  a  zone 
sui generis.  The  present  approach consists of defining this system 
in terms  of  11residual rights":  the rights attaching to the resources 
of the  zone  belong to the coastal State  and  other States will enjoy 
the freedoms  of navigation and communication,  p:r:ovided that this is 
without  prejudice to  such rights.  This Ts·- apparen~ in general terms 
from  Articles 44 1  46  and  47  of Part  II and was  emphasized by the 
Chairman  of the  Second  Committee  in his introductory note to the 
. revised text  of Part  II. 
The  difficulties created by certain  prov~s~ons of Part III  (revised) 
result  from  the delimitation of the  jurisdiction granted to the 
coastal State and of the extent  of the  residual rights of the flag 
State. 
Article 4  of Part  III  lays  dmm  as  a  general rule that  the measures 
to be  adopted t,o  combat  pollution caused by vessels  should apply for 
example  to the prevention-of accidents,  the safety of operations at 
sea; the control  of discharges  and the construction,  equipment  and 
operation of vessels. - 48-
It is therefore  a  question of an  extremely.wide  range  of potential 
interventions. 
As  regards the territorial sea,  the coastal State will be  able to 
establish national rules,  lrli thout  prejudice to the right of innocent 
passage provided for in Part II.  As  regards the exclusive  economic 
zone,  the coastal State '.rill be  able to  enforce rules  and standards 
drawn up  on an international ba3is.  It will also be  able to establish 
special rules for the application of these rules  and  standards in 
special  zones,  provided that this is not  opposed by the competent 
international organization (Article  21).  .  .. 
In Section VII  on Enforcement,  it is laid do<{n that the flag State 
must  ensure that  international rules  and standards  for the prevention 
of pollution are  complied 111i th (Article  27).  The  provisions to the 
prerogatives of the port  State (Articles 28,  29  and 30)  are very 
broad and would allow the latter to exercise extensive  and often 
undefined powers  in respect  of foreign vessels which had infringed 
national or international regulations relating to the prevention of 
pollution caused in.the territorial sea or in the  economic  zone. 
In Section VIII,  extensive  and often undefined pov:ers  are also granted 
to the coastal State '"ith regard to the  institution of proceedings 
against  and the  detention of foreign vessels  The  provisions relating 
to penalties which may  be  imposed upon foreign vessels  are also lacking 
in clarity. 
Finally,  it is laid down  that the prons1.ons of Part  III will be 
applied without  prejudice to the right  of free  passage in international 
straits. 
In conclusion,  the Revised Single Negotiating Text  lays  dovm  that the 
powers  of the coastal State in respect of pollution would be  extended 
throughout  ~he economic  zone  and vwuld relate to all international 
rules  and standards,  while  allowing it to  apply national rules in the 
territorial sea.  The  powers  to institute legal proceedings  appear to 
be very extensive but  undefined,  in the  case of bo.th  flae;rant  breaches 
of internatior..al  rules  on the  dumping  of waste  and other infringements 
causing or likely to cause  serious  damage  to the coastal State.  Pmv-ers. 
to institute legal proceedings  are  also  granted to the port  State, 
either on its o'lm initiative or at  the request1of another State  (flag 
State or coastal State). - 49-
It may  be. said that the  Revised Single negotiating Text  sho'tJS  little 
evidence  of the  work  of this Session and  embodies  a  large proportion 
of the proposals  of the Evensen  Group.  It is  a  text uhich  cannot  claim 
to be  a  "basis for negotiation" insofar as it c.1,dopts  the  arguments  of 
only one  of the groups  present.  This text could  th~refore impede the 
favourable  course of the  proceedings  insofar as it veers  aHay  from 
a  compromise  position Hhich could be  negotiated beh;een the hw main 
bodies of opinion.  Moreover,  if negotiations Here  to  get  bogced  do~m 
on this text,  they could hold up \vork  in general. 
(iv)  Conclusions  and proposed guidelines  for the next  session of the 
Conference 
The  measures to be  adopted  ~·1i th regard to protection against pollution 
from vessels are of considerable interest to the  Community  and its 
Member  States  from three aspects: 
(i)  the  fight  against  pollution; 
(ii)  the preservation of the  freedom of navigation;. 
(iii) its influence  on the outcome  of the Conference. 
It is proposed that the  Community  and its Hember  States  adopt  a  common 
position on this q:uestion.  The  Cormnission  proposes that priority 
be given to the  exercise of the rights of the flag State while 
granting the coastal State control  over  a  specific 50 mile  zone  in 
Hhich it 1·10uld  exercise precise  and limited rights. -50-
/ 
5·  l>lARINE  SCISHTJFIC  R..'SSZARCH 
The principal issue has been that of determining .the rights of the 
COflStal  State as recards the conduct  of scientific research in the 
economic' 'Zone.  The  "Group of 77",  tocether  \~i th Canada,  have 
sought to make  such research dependent  on the unrestricted consent 
of the coastal  St~te.  The  developed countries,  on the other hand  .  1 
have uished to maintain the existing freedom,  subject to  tlCCeptnrice 
by  rc~earching States of  ~bli&ations designed to protect specific 
.coastal State interests.  ·· 
'i) Revised Sinfjle  ~Te,sotiatinr::- Text 
a)  i~SR in the territorial sea.  a!:.d  in the. econo::1ic  zone 
In the 1975  Sint;le Negotiatin& Text the coastal State  \·:~s  given 
full  control over I:iSR  in the territo!'ial sea;  thin  t-~as  comrnon 
ground from the outset.  As  regards the  econol!lic  zone  a1:d 
continent<:l.l  shelf 1  there 1m.s  an inconsistency beh;een ?arts II 
and III of the Text.  Under .Article 45 1  F'art  II,  the  coastal 
State NUS  civen "exclusive  jurird.iction" \·;ith  re&ard to scientific 
research in the  zone.  In Part III  1  hol·rever1  a  di~tinction uas 
dra\m beh1een research related to rer:;ources in the  zone  and 
continental shelf  1  and  fund<:..-nento.l  research.  The  conditions to be 
met by the research State  (e.g.  as  regards access to data and 
opport~1ities for participation}. \:ere oade more  stri1~t;c21t in the -
case of rer;:;ource  related research.  A coa.ntal  State could only 
object to  a  fundaoent~l research project if it considered that 
its rights  over natural  resources Her-e  infrin,sed.  Di::>putes  \·:ere 
to be settled in a·ccordance \·lith the  compulsory  disputes  :::ettlemcnt 
procedurc.s. 
At  the  l<e~·r  York session the approach  b~sed on the distinction 
beh1een resource related and  ftmda.rnental  research l:as  attac!:ed by 
. the "Group of 77"  a'1d  Canada as not  reflecti11g the vie\·:S  of the 
majority.  Full coastal State control over all J.lSR  \:as  demanded. 
It proved inpossible to reach  agreement  durinb informal negotiations 
in closed groups  m.;ing to the  eQerE;ence  of an  increused preoccupatio::! 
on the part of some  developing coastal States with national security 
interests  1  \·lhich  effectively blocked progress toHards  a  cooprornise. 
The  main  feature of tho  F:cviscd Si!lr;le !Tc;:otb  .. tin;: Text  is the 
replacement- of the distinct  ion llLJ..scd. ·, ·rcc;i:ao  for  ~.~;,::-~  in the  ccono::~ic 
zone or continental shelf of a  coastal St2te by  a  consent  regime 
for all i-ISR,  aionc 1;he  lines of the 1958  Geneva  Continental  s:hclf 
Convention. 
The coastal State ohall not  Hithhold its cor.sent  unless the project 
(a) relates sucsta.nt iall;r  to  the  e~ploration <U1d  exploi  tr:.tion of 
resources;  (b)  involves  drilling or the use of 
cxplonivcs;  (c)  interfere::;  unduly 1:ith economic  activit).csj  (d)  i::;,vo::.ves 
the ~consfruction or use of artifi  cal  islcmdr:;  and r;truct  urcs. 
1  The  Comtlunity states cnn accept  a.  'con::>cl1t 1  rccimc .f?:r  !.:s~. 
·~  Or!  t1:c  ccnt).!~r-:;f~t::.::_  f~}·,t.::J.l"  ;wJcl  ir:  f~.C>~  pru.ctioc  ·~r11~:  rC(;;li"':C 
as  J.c.id  do:·.rn  :i.n  the:  195iJ  Gr:n.':Va  Cot;~:i.r.u.tc.l  :;;hclf  Col:vc::n"  .. H>n, - 51-
i 
The  distinction bch1een resource-related and  fundc.r;lental 
research remains,  houever,  in Article 60  (a)  ~·:here  resenrch 
bearing upon  resources is one of the categories of research  ro. r 
which a  coastal Stnte has the ric."'lt  to \·l'ithhold its consent 
' ' 
b) J:!"-!"ine  Scie~tific Research in tho  Intc:::-~ational  Se~-bed }.xe?. 
The  r.cvised Single !!ego.tio.tir.t;  Text  is an improvement  on the 
1975  Text  ond  tcl~es  account  o"f  certain o.mend;nents  presented by 
l<Iember  Stdes. 
·In Part  I  of the  pre~ent Text  1  !·!SR  is no  lonGer  expressly mentioned 
as  one of the "activities in the Areo.11  in .Article  11  n:1d  t;lc 
exclusive role of the Authority to control  c.nd  cnrry o'.lt  I<lS::  in 
the crea has  been mod.ifiE:d•  All  reference to tl1e  .A:r!:hority  f'_2.s  been 
dropped in Part III  1  !.r"ti-cle  68,  z.nd  nll St2.tes  a..>·Hl  com.petcnt 
-orcanisdionn h2.ve  the ric;ht  1  thoUGh  in confor~i  t;r ui  th tr.e 
provisions of Part  I 1  to co1:duct  J:.:sR  in the Area. 
c)  ,DisJ?;uhss~tlement 
A more  posi ti  vc fedure,  from the point of vie;·r of Co:nmur.i ty end 
other research·:  States,  is the inclusion in the Revised Text  of 
a  compul1:;ory conciliation procedure  (l.rticle 76)  for the settlement 
.of disputes, before reference to the general  dispute  settle:::ent  pro-
cedures of the  Convention.  The  .conciliation procedure laid do'.·m 
is largely based on  a  Community  proposal  and is dcsiv.cd to 
achieve rapid settlement  of such  problems  as  may  arise.  Ho:·;evex·, 
the value of this procedure  must  be closely cxa.rr:ir:.ed -to  see  ho~·r 
many  research disputes can actually be  broUGht  before it. 
The  dispute settlement procedures  in P~  IV  are  co~~uzed ~~d 
unsatisfactory l·rith  respect  to  l~SR.  Insofar as  I·!S:t  falls  1.l1-:.der 
the "exclusive jurisdiction" of a  coastal State in Part  II  1  it 
. is uncertc.in uhether disputes  re;;a.rdin~:; !.ISR  l·:ould  cone  u11der  the 
'compulsory system Hith respect to settleiaent,  or be disputes under 
the nexce:ptions" listed in Article 18  of Part  IV. 
1 According to Article 64,  this is the only category listed in 
Article 60 for vrhich  a  coastal State must  actively refuse its 
consent;- if there is no  reaction,  cor:.ccnt  is ioplied,  •·;hereas 
for the  other cate.;orics b)  1  c)  and d)  no  reaction from  ti1e 
coastal  State  seems  to imply refusal of consent.  This gi  vcs  the 
coastal State uidc discretion,  especi;;..lly under  c2.tecory 
Article 60  (c),  to refuse  a  project  on the grounds that it 
}'uvduly, interferes  \~i th economic  ucti  vi  tics performed by the 
coar>tal  State in accordance :·1ith  its jurisdiction"  us  provided 
for in the·  Convention,  and the explicit  consent  required here 
tlk"lkes  puttinc into operation of the  clizpute-settlement  procedures 
by a  researchinG State very difficult.  In addition to these 
cxtcnsi  ve  pouers  1  the  co~Dt<!l State  c1Jn  require ceszation of rmy 
project in its.ccono:nic  zone  or on  its continental shelf (Article 
65)  uith neemincly  col~plcte discretion. -52-
Ji)  Cor.un1mi ty co.:..ord.inat ion 
iii) 
Co-ordination meetint;s  in order to achieve  common  positions Nere 
held throuehout the session.  Early on in the informal Third 
.qommi~~ee discussions  a  statement  \·;as  made  "Py  the Ketherla11ds 
on behalf of the Corornw1ity  States oupporting the  S!:-T  no  a  bn.sis . 
for compromise,  and ocl<:ins it clear that the amendr:1ents  presented 
from the floor by J.icmber  St11tes  Here  supported by the others. 
A common  position had been achieved in B~~ssels on the substar.tive 
issues,  cmd  amendments .had  bc~n dr~m up for most  Articles,  largely 
in defense of the 1975  SNT • 
.. The ·main purpose of Com.r:1unity  amendments  were: 
- to clarify the distinction bet1-1cen  different  catec;ories 
of lvlSU 1  in particular bet\\'een I-!SR  directly related to the 
exploration and exploitati.on of resources  and HSR  not  so 
related; 
- to include a  compulsory procedure of conciliation for l:ISR 
disputes,  before reference to the general  dispute  settlement 
procedures of the  Convention. 
It mai be not.ed·  that  -ti-!e-lietherl2.i1-ci:i·--.md.  the Federal  Republic 
of'  Germany  co-sponsor~d  the  LL  and  CID3 1  amendncnts  (1;hich present 
considerable difficulties to  th~ rest of the Nine).  Thin 
illustrates the wider  problem of partiqi.pation of Member  States 
in different informal  groupings  jeopardizing co:nmon  EC  ;posi~_ion~. 
Proposed  b;tlidtllines  for r.ext  sessio~ of the Conference 
The  "consent" regime in the form nou  embodied in the Revised  S:::TT 
for all llSR carried out  in the econo:nie  zone is,  fron the point 
of' vie•1  of' the developed co:untries,  a· step back"t:ards  from the 
l97~Text and should be  opposed.'  The  system could only be 
accepted only ir..::;ofar  as  (a) the conditions under \·:hich  the 
coastal ·state. mi!;ht  refuse the con(!ent·were !:lade  more  specific 
and more  limited;  (b)  there is generc..l  acceptance  ct the 
Conference of an effective conciliation procedure;  ar-d  (c)  disputes 
conce~ning marine' scientific research in the  zone  are subject 
to the general  dinputes  settlement  procedure of the  Convention. 
The  rerno.ininb parts of the Text  require careful  exanination at 
. expert  level prior to the next  ocssion. -53-
6.  TRA}1Sii'.rm  OF  KillTI:E  TECiriTOLOGY 
i) Develonncnts  nt  Fourth Session  <!nd  nnalvsis  of Revised Sinr:le 
lier;otintir.r; Text 
The 1975  Text  incorporated n:any  of the dccands  of the "Grouo of 
77
11  for aid in the devc1opt?ent  of their research a."ld  tcchnoiogical: · 
capacity,  Hi th provisior. of safeguards for holders  and suppliers 
of technclo.;y  ru>  dei.C.mdcd  by the  developed States.  · 
In. particular it uas proposed that Stutes \·!ere  required to npro:note 
the establishment  of U."li vcrsally accepted [;Uidclines11  for the 
transfer of marine  technology  1  und that provisior. be  r.:n.de  for the 
establish  ..  "llent  of :tegior.al  mari~e scientific and technological 
research centres. 
\'lith respect  to the Internatio!lal  Sea-bed Area,  States t·:ere  to 
cooperate \·ri th the Authority to  encoura(;e  and facilitate transfer 
of marine technology and skills for exploration and exploitation 
of the International· Sea-bed J..rea  and.  the Authority itself ~!as to 
be given  an  active role to ensure increased participation and  , 
traini:n.:; of nationals of developing States in the transfer process. 
Debate  at the Ne1·1  York  Session Has  Generalised ui  th attention focused 
mainly on the role of the  Internation;;:.l  Sea-bed .oi.uthority  in the 
transfer process  and· the value  and functi:onf:!  of regional I:larine 
. ·scientific and technolocical centres. 
As  re~;ardn- the role of the  Int'Jr~c.tio!1;:l  Sc<:>.-Bcd  A'.ithorj.~.;y  in the 
1975  SliT the ISBA  v!as  given con::;i<.lcrable  po\rc::.·s  to tra.r:.nfer marine 
technolo;;y and vtas  strongly defended by the  "Group  of 77".  The 
EC  ].!!ember  States  1  to~ether ;·iHh other developed States  1  proposed 
deletion of all reference to the  ISA  in Part III  and neGotiation on 
this matter in the First  Committee  (Article II, Part  I). 
As  recards  Rer;ional  J;:z..rine  Scientific  a."ld  rrcc~nolor,ical  Centres there 
was  l-iidc:::prcad cri  ticizm of the  aJ.l-E:ulbr.:,cinc  role to be gi  von to 
these centres·-.  It  ~~as felt that the role of national centres  could 
be  undermined and the task of international  or;;~isatior.s in this 
field could" be  unnecessarily complicated.  The  Nine  objected tc ma.l.::.ing  these 
centres re.Podtor:les  f~r patented tecnnoiogy.- ~\ detailed pr~pocal 
to set  up  a  nm·z  International body to tra."lsfcr marine  technology Nas 
proposed· by Equador but  did not  receive much  support. 
There is no  substantive changes  in the  Revised  S1~T from the 1975  • 
Geneva  SliT.  The 
19Group  of 77"  der:Jc::nds  for  r:10rc  strincent obligations 
on  developed "Stalics  have not been incl  udcd 1  but  the provisions 
concerning transfer of nor.-proprietory tcchnoloey have been increased. 
References to transfer of patented teclmology have  been  removed. -54-
The  arttcle on transfer of marine technology in co-operation with 
the  International  Sea-Bed Author-ity has been modified to take  accmmt 
of the "legitimate Rights  of holders  and suppliers" of technology, 
and is.subject to Article 10 1  Part  I  of!the  R~TT. 
A proposal by. Portugal for co-operation among  International 
Ort;anisations dealing with the transfer of marine  technolog;y  received 
widespread support  and appears in the Revised Sinr,lc r;e.;otiatinc 
Text. 
ii) Con'llunitv Co-ordinc;,tion 
'l'he  EC  !·~e:nber States co-ordinated their amendments  (previously 
·agreed on in Brussels) throu.:;hout  the debates.  The  amendr.ents  \·Jere 
mainly intended to provide Greater protection for holders  cmd 
suppliers of technolOGY·  and to a.ttcnua-;e the  bir.di:r:..;  nature of the 
obligations incurred.  The  only ·substantive  amend:ncnt  r>roposed  by 
the Hine  \·Ills  the deletion of all refc.rcnce to the role of the 
International  Sea-Bed Authority in the transfer process  in Part  III 
of the SNT  and negotiation in Part I. 
iii) Pronosed orientations for the next  session of the  Conference 
~t is recommended that the main approach of the present  Text  should 
be accepted.· 
The full import  of the detailed role to be given to the regionc.l 
centres sh,ould1  hm·:ever,  be  <!Ilalyscd1  particularly in light of 
developments  on this question in  ffi~CTAD  IV. 
'l'he  neo·/  text 1-Jill  also have to be  examined to see if it accords •·rith 
the Community's position on transfer of technolor;y negotations 
elser~here. 
Finally, the utility of linking negotiation on transfer of. technology 
with the negomtions  on marine scientific research should perhaps  be 
re-examined. - 55-
..  ... 
-1.·  The  Settlement of Disgutes 
.  :. 
i) Ancil:zsiULthe. SinglELNegoliating Text 
···-r 
---:::::---:--'::-~-:-
The  developed countries have  attached importance  to the  inclusion in the 
Convention of a  system for the  compulsory  settlement· of disputes  a.s  an integral 
part of the future  law of the sea system.  The  United States,· together with 
Community  States, has been particularly active in this regard.  The  ffiotive  behind 
these efforts has  stemmed  from a  traditional attachrrent to legal  modes  of 
settlement,  and a  desire to provide  a  means  of recourse against  any  abuse  which 
might  occur of the discretion given to coastal states as  regards activities in 
the economic  zone.  The  main  difficulties in securing these objectives  have  been 
the habitual reluctance of the USSR  to accept  compulsory  forms  of international 
disputes settlement  and the  extre~e sensibility of developing countries  with 
·respect to issues touching their "sovereign rights".  Discussion on  this ·item 
has  proceeded more  sloHly than on  other topics l)  ,"  and efforts \dll be  made  at 
the next session to give special attention to this aspect  of the work  of the 
Conference,  so as to bring it up  to the  same  stage as the  items. 
A wide  measure  of support  for the principle that the  Convention should 
include means  of disputes settlement  now  exists  ~t the  Conference.  The  Text 
of Part IV  of the  Convention which  has  been  drawn  up is 1however1 extrenely 
complex,  so as  ~o offer numerous  pqssib~lities for delays  and procedural  arguments 
before a  settlement is reached.  It is difficult furthermore  to  determine  the  r~bC 
of rights which.would be  effectively protected under the  system;  this applies  in 
particular as regards disputes  concerning fishing and the  conduct  of scientific 
research in the economic  zone • 
.  ·The  main lines of the system proposed are set out  below. 
In the opening section it is provided that parties  may  chose  their own 
means  for the settlement of disputes;  th~ Convention  system only  comes  into 
operation if su.ch  means  have  been  exhausted or if the parties are  unable  to  agree 
on  the  choice of procedure.  If the parties have  already agreed on  a  general, 
·regional or special system for the settlement  of disputes,  that system is .to  apply. 
(1)  In consequence the present Text  is still at an  11informal
11  and  not yet  at  a 
"revised11  stage. -56- '  ( 
. (Thus,  in the case of F.ember  States and the  Community,  in the  event  of a  dispute 
amongst  them involving Communi t~law and the  law of the sea,  the European Court  .  e 
of Justice  wou~d continue to be  appropriate  forum) •. Special provision is made 
for the use  of concili_ation procedures,  if the parties so decide. 
Where  recourse to means  of.  the parties  o~~ chwsing does  not  provide  a 
solution,  the  Convention system  applie'~,  offering parties to disputes  a  choice 
between four procedures  : 
the La,.,  of the Sea Tribunal  (a perlll3llent  body  of 15  members) 
· ·- the International Court  of Justice 
-arbitral proceedings  (a statute is provided for  ad  hoc  arbitral bodies) 
- special procedures· with  r~spect to disputes  concerning fisheries,  pollutic~ 1 
scientific research and navigation {the use of expert  bodies  chosen  fron 
_lists  maintained by the specialized bodies of the UN). 
Separate arrangements  are  envisaged as regards sea-bed disputes.  Provisi~n is 
also made  for the possibility of the exercise of appellate  jurisdiction. 
Access  to tliese  procedures is open solely to contracti:J.g parties  except 
.. 
in the  case  of actions  arising out  of the detention of  vessel~ a~d (possibly) 
contractual disputes in respect  of .·sea-bed operations. 
~lliere the parties have  not  chosen the same  means  of settleffient,  the defendant 
would be  able to  chose the  means  which would be  used.  This  v10uld  enable the 
defendant  to  chose  the  forum vrhich .'l'rould  be  r::ost  likely to find in his favour. 
In view of the  elerr.ent  of uncertainty as to the range  of rights which NOuld  be 
protected under the  system,  and the possibility that  a  body such as  the Law  of 
the Sea Tribunal· might  tend to give  judgements  supporting a  wide  interpretation 
of the rights of  coa~al states  t  it has  been sllggested that it would  be  preferable 
that arbitration should be  taken as the  common  denominator  of the  system.  Thus, 
in the event that the two  parties  had not, chosen the  same  means  of settlement 
and did not  agree  on an alternative,  recourse  would  be  had to arbitration as  the 
means.  This  approach  might  also  be  more  generally acceptable at the  Conference 
than the  system proposed in the  present  SN'l'. -57-
The  definition of exceptions to the procedures has been·a. controversial 
issue.  Under  the present text there is no  obligation to submit for settlement 
disputes  concerning the exercise  by  a  coastal state of its sovereign or exclusive 
rights or of  it~ exclusive  jurisdiction (i.e. its ri~hts in its territorial sea 
-or econorni c  zone) 1  except  : 
(a) \fuen it is claimed the· coastal state has violated its obligations under 
the Convention by interfering with freedom of navigation or overflight, 
'  the freedom to lay submarine  cables  or pipelines,  or  by  failing to give. 
due  regard to any substantive rights specifically established in favour 
of other states.  It is not entirely clear from  the present Text  \ihc.t 
the range of such substaJJ,tive rights  \rould  be,  in particular l-lhether  they 
relate to fish and the  conduct  of scientific research.  The  lack of 
precision with respect to this phrase wiil be  amongst  the  matters to 
which further attention will need to be  given at the  next session. 
(b)  \fuen it is claimed that another state has failed to respect the  lal-rs 
and regulations of the  coastal state. 
.  . 
(c)  ~llien it is claimed that  a  coastal state·has violated its obligations 
as regards the application of .  international standards  and criteria 
relating t~ preservation ~f the marine  environment. 
Individual contracting parties  may  make  declarations stating that they do  not 
accept the settlement procedures in·respect of disputes over  sea boundary 
'limitations,  disputes  concerning military activities,  or disputes which are being 
dealt with by the  Securi~y Council. 
i~) Community  co-ordination 
\·. 
A number  of Member .states participated in the informal l-rorking  group  which 
met  at Conference  sessions in '1974  and 1975  and there "'ere  several expert  meetings 
..  within the political cooperation framework  without  Commission  representatives 
being invited.  The  Commission  representatives point.ed  out  that this \'las  in 
contradiction with the  tr~sfer of competence  to the  Community,  on  the basis of 
which the  Community  trould need to become  a  party to the  Convention  and would itself 
be  a  potential party to disputes.  At  the  New  York  session there  l-Tas  a  general 
discussion at head3  of delegation level,  together with the  Commission,  of the line 
.to be  taken during -the  .general debate _,on  disputes settlement. -58-
_  ~~L_Pr~ose~  orientati~~s for the next  session of the  Conference 
It is recommended  that ?·:ember  States should  c~ntinue .to support the inclusio:l 
in the  Convention of compulsory  disputes  settlement procedures: as  an  integral 
part of the overall arrangements.  "The  adoption of recourse to arbitration,  in 
the event that the two  parties _have  not  chosen the same  form  of settlerr.ent,  would 
appear desirable in view of the uncertainty which exists as regards  the  extent to 
which rights_ in the economic  zone  are protected under the  system,and the  poasibili~; 
that the Law  of the Sea Tribunal  may  tend to  adopt  decisions  supportin,; ,.fide 
interpretations of the rights of coastal states.  An  approach  ~long these lines 
might  also  make  the system more  generally acceptable  at the  Conference. 
Efforts should be  w.ade  to enable the  .. system. to apply as  widely  as  possible 
trith respect to disputes regarding the  exercise of coastal states' riehts 
affecting those of other states. 
~he fact that the disputes  settlement  procedure will be  applicable to 
disputes to which the  Co~ty  itself may  be .a party should continue to be 
kept .  in viel'l. y 
8.,  frovisions  for overseas countries and territories 
---~--------------~-------
The  SNT  discussed in New  York  contains an article of a  highly political 
nature  {Part II, Article 136)  on  territories "under foreign occupation or 
colonial domination"•  It applies in particular to certain non-independent 
territories still administered by Member  States of the Community:  France~ 
the United Kingdom  arid  the Netherlands. 
The  Article contains three paragraphs: 
lo  The  rights which  shall be  recognized or established by  the future 
Convention  over the resources of the territories in question shall 
apply to the inhabitants of those territories, who  shall exercise 
them to their advantage  and in accordance with their needs and 
necessities. 
2.  In the  event  of any dispute  concerning the  sovenilignty of one  of 
those .territories, the rights concerning their resources l!lhall  not 
be  exercised if the  dispute has not  been settled in accordance with 
the  aims  and principles of the Charter of the United Nations. 
3·  No  metropolitan or foreign power  which administers these  same 
territories shall exercise  rights over their resources, profit or 
benefit  from  them  or prejudice them  in any w~·whatsoever. 
Article  136  is meeting with vigorous opposition from France and the United 
Kingdom,  and  to a  lesser degree  from  the Netherlands.  France,  in particular, 
has let it be  known  on  several  occasions that if Article 136  were  to be 
retained in its present  form,  she  could not  see  her w~  to ratifYing the 
future  Convention  on  the  Law  of the Sea. 
The  concern of certain Member  States over Article 136  has been voiced at 
several meetings  on  Community  coordination in New  York.  At  the  meetings, 
all the Member. States agreed that  they would  express their joint opposition 
to Article  136  at the Conference.  For tactical reasons,  it was  agreed to 
take  the  line that the. text  should be  amended  to eliminate its unacceptable 
features instead of proposing that it be  completely deleted. - 60-
Two  texts have  been submitted to this effect,  one  by France,  the other by 
the Netherlands.  Both texts proposed the deletion of paragraphs 2  and  3 · 
and the rewordiDg  of paragraph 1.  The  French amendment  was  based largely 
on  the  idea that Article 136  would  contravene the provisions of the United 
Nations Charter,  which defines the responsibilities of powers  administering 
non-independent territories.  The  basic justification for the Dutch amendment 
was  the notion that the  future  Convention  should not  settle issues of 
sovereignty. 
The  two  amendments,  very mu.ch  akin in spirit, were  supported by  all the  other 
Member. States.  Similar amendments  were  tabled by  Israel and the United 
States, which threatened not to  sign the Convention if Article 136  was 
retained in its present  form. 
Like  the attitude of the United States and Israel, the position of the Nine 
was  opposed by  a  considerable number  of delegations.  Most  of them wanted 
the Article to be  retained and  supplemented by an  amendment  tabled by the 
group of Arab  states seeking to  a~d to the territories listed in paragraph 1 
of Article 136  those territories which are represented by recognized 
liberation movements,  in their respective regions,  by the Arab  League 
or by the Organization for African Unity.  A good number  of delegations, 
largely from  Commonwealth  countries,  joined with the Nine  in calling for 
the  deletion of paragraph 2. 
The  Revised SNT  makes  no  major amendments  to Article 136.  . It includes 
neither the French and Dutch amendments  nor the  Arab  group's amendment  and it 
retains paragupp 2,  although the latter is couched in more  subtle terms 
than the  origfnal text.  Moreover,  in his comments  on  the Revised SNT,  the 
Chairman·of the Second Commission,  acknowledges that  Article 136  deals with 
questions which lie outside the  scope  of the  law  of the sea.  Lastly, 
the article has been included in the  Revised SNT  in the  form  of a  transitional 
provision to make  it quite clear that  the  issues it considers are  in no 
sense  hard and fast. 
' - 61-
Even  as amended,  the wording and form  of the article are still unacceptable 
to the Member  States concerned.  This throws  doubt  on  whether certain of 
those  Member  States, and consequently the Community,  will accede to the 
Conventio~.  As  matters stand, the question must  be.broached at high level 
with the other principal non-member  countries involved. ANNEX  I  (to the MrnEX) 
SUMMARY  ANALYSIS  OF  THE  PROVISIONS  CONCERNING  TAX  ANil  DUTY  EXEMPTION 
FOR  THE  INTERNATIONAL  SEA-BED  AUTHORITY 
1.  Article 60  of the SNT  stipulates that the  ISBA  shall be  completely 
exempt  from.all  duties  and taxes  in respect  of its assets,  its property, 
its income  and  operations.  · 
Furthermore,  Article 9 of the draft  statutes of the  ISBA  stipulates the 
same  exemption  for the Enterprise. 
2.  At  first sight,  these clauses appear to be  concerned mainly with the 
"privileges and  immunities" aspect  of the statutes of the Authority and 
its executive body,  the Enterprise. 
Actually,  both Article 9 of the draft  statutes of the Enterprise and 
Article 60  concerning the Authority are to be  found  in the section 
entitled "Privileges and  Immunitiestl. 
It may  be  regarded as current  and  standard practice,  whenever the 
"birth certifica-te" of a  new  international organization is issued,  to 
provide for it the privileges and  immunities  under  common  law as it 
were,  -to  enable it ·to function normally. 
It is on this basis that  such arrangements  exist for the United Nations 
Organization,  -the  specialized institutions and  the institutions of the 
Community  itself. 
3.  In the absence  of more  de-tailed information on  -the  objectives and 
motives  of those who  drafted the -texts,  one  may  ask whether,  beyond the 
normal  and administrative operations of the Authority and the Enterprise, 
these provisions refer to the industrial activities of the Enterprise 
itself.  At  all events,  that is a  possible  interpretation and it has 
been taken into account  in this paper. .. 
-2-
4·  Taking the wide  interpretation and allowing that  customs  exemption 
also covers the industrial activities of the Enterprise and the 
products of its activities,  then Community  competence is clearly involved  • 
For information purposes,  the following points  should also be noted: 
{a) 
(b) 
(c) 
economically speaking,  it is in the long-standing interests of the 
industrial countries to· import  duty-free the ores and metals 
necessary for their industries.  This is the  case with regard to 
the EEC  tariff (consolidated exemption),  the US  tariff 
{non-consolidated exemption),  the  Canadian tariff (consolidated 
exemption),  the Japanese tariff (exemption for  ores only),  etc.; 
from  the legal point  of view,  however,  these tariff concessions 
theoretically apply to the  Contracting Parties to  GATT  (the  EEC 
automatically applies the  same  tariff to the East  European countries, 
even when  they are not  members  of GATT),  but  the question may  arise 
as  to whether the ores or crude metals produced by  the Enterprise 
are to be regarded as  originating in a  "new  country";  a  rider to 
this is the problem of defining,  for  customs  purposes,  the origin of 
these products; 
the situation is even more  complicated if one  considers not  only ore 
or raw  metal,  but  semi-finished products i.e., bars,  sections, 
sheets,  tubes,  pipes,  etc., for although these semi-finished products 
are usually liable for  customs  duty,  a  good  many  of those tariff 
headings are covered by the  Generalized System  of Preferences  (GSP). 
The  GSP  is obviously a  Community  instrument;  but  application of any 
exemption for products  supplied by the Enterprise would  probably 
raise problems  which would  impinge  on  management  of the  GSP 
(definition of eligible "countries",  questions of origin,  etc.). 